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Abstract
We propose a class of multiple-prior representations of preferences under ambiguity, where the belief the decision-maker (DM) uses to evaluate an uncertain prospect
is the outcome of a game played by two conflicting forces, Pessimism and Optimism.
The model does not restrict the sign of the DM’s ambiguity attitude, and we show
that it provides a unified framework through which to characterize different degrees of
ambiguity aversion, and to represent the co-existence of negative and positive ambiguity attitudes within individuals as documented in experiments. We prove that our
baseline representation, dual-self expected utility (DSEU), yields a novel representation
of the class of invariant biseparable preferences (Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci, 2004), which drops uncertainty aversion from maxmin expected utility (Gilboa
and Schmeidler, 1989). Extensions of DSEU allow for more general departures from
independence.
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Introduction

1.1

Motivation and Overview

A central approach to modeling preferences under ambiguity is based on the idea that the
decision-maker (DM) quantifies uncertainty with a set of relevant beliefs and may use a
different belief from this set to evaluate each uncertain prospect. A well-known limitation underlying many such multiple-prior models—notably Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989)
∗

Chandrasekher:
Pinterest, Inc (mcchandrasekher@gmail.com);
Frick:
Yale University
(mira.frick@yale.edu); Iijima: Yale University (ryota.iijima@yale.edu); Le Yaouanq: Ludwig-MaximiliansUniversität, Munich (yves.leyaouanq@econ.lmu.de). This paper joins and supersedes two independent
working papers: Chandrasekher (2019) and Frick, Iijima, and Le Yaouanq (2019). We are grateful to Bart
Lipman and four anonymous referees for comments that greatly improved the paper. We also thank David
Ahn, Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Chris Chambers, Jetlir Duraj, Drew Fudenberg, Faruk Gul, Jay Lu, Fabio
Maccheroni, Efe Ok, Pietro Ortoleva, Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Kota Saito, Tomasz Strzalecki, and various
seminar audiences. This research was supported by NSF grant SES-1824324 (Frick and Iijima) and the
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through CRC TRR 190 (Le Yaouanq).

1

maxmin expected utility model and several of its generalizations1 —is a restrictive mechanism
of belief selection, whereby the DM evaluates each prospect according to the worst possible
relevant belief. Behaviorally, this restriction is reflected by Schmeidler’s (1989) uncertainty
aversion axiom, which captures a negative attitude towards ambiguity through a strong form
of preference for hedging.
While consistent with Ellsberg’s seminal two-color urn experiment, the uncertainty aversion axiom has been questioned both by subsequent theoretical work, which has proposed
alternative formalizations and measures of ambiguity aversion,2 as well as based on more recent experimental evidence. Indeed, this evidence points to more nuanced patterns of ambiguity attitudes: The same subjects may appear ambiguity-averse in some decision problems,
but may also display ambiguity-seeking preferences in other notable settings, some of which
we discuss below (for a survey, see Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2015).
In this paper, we propose a decision-theoretic framework that provides a unified lens
through which to formalize and contrast such mixed attitudes towards ambiguity and to
explore their economic implications. To do so, we introduce a class of multiple-prior representations that allows for a flexible mechanism of belief selection: Instead of assuming that
the DM uses the worst possible belief to evaluate any given prospect, our representations
adopt a “dual-self” perspective on ambiguity, by modeling the DM’s belief selection as the
outcome of a game between two conflicting forces, Pessimism and Optimism.3
Our baseline representation generalizes maxmin expected utility by incorporating an
ambiguity-seeking force via the addition of a maximization stage: Under dual-self expected
utility (DSEU), there is a compact collection P of closed and convex sets of beliefs and an
affine utility u such that the DM evaluates each (Anscombe-Aumann) act f according to
WDSEU (f ) = max min Eµ [u(f )].
P ∈P µ∈P

(1)

That is, the belief used to evaluate f is the outcome of a sequential zero-sum game: First,
Optimism chooses a set of beliefs P from the collection P with the goal of maximizing the
DM’s expected utility to f ; then Pessimism chooses a belief µ from P with the goal of
minimizing expected utility. Maxmin expected utility corresponds to the extreme case in
which Optimism has no choice, while the opposite extreme, maxmax expected utility, results
1

See, for example, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006); Chateauneuf and Faro (2009); Strzalecki
(2011); Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio (2011); Skiadas (2013).
2
See, for instance, Epstein (1999); Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002); Baillon, L’Haridon, and Placido
(2011); Dow and Werlang (1992); Baillon, Huang, Selim, and Wakker (2018).
3
The idea that the DM consists of multiple strategic selves with conflicting motives is employed frequently
in behavioral economics, for example to model risk preferences and intertemporal choices (e.g., Thaler and
Shefrin, 1981; Fudenberg and Levine, 2006; Brocas and Carrillo, 2008).
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when Pessimism has no choice.
Our main results are twofold. First, we provide foundations for the DSEU model. Theorem 1 shows that DSEU represents the class of preferences that satisfy all of Gilboa and
Schmeidler’s (1989) axioms except for uncertainty aversion; thus, the presence of ambiguity
is captured solely by relaxing independence to certainty independence, without additionally
restricting the DM’s ambiguity attitude to be negative (or positive). Beyond maxmin and
maxmax expected utility, this class of preferences—known as invariant biseparable—nests
Choquet expected utility and α-MEU as notable special cases. Obtaining an easy-to-interpret
representation of invariant biseparable preferences has been considered an important question
in the ambiguity literature, and Section 1.2 spells out some advantages of DSEU relative to
existing representations due to Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) and Amarante
(2009). Moreover, Section 4.3 shows that the dual-self approach extends beyond this class,
as natural extensions of DSEU represent generalizations of invariant biseparable preferences
that further relax certainty independence.
Proposition 1 notes that any DSEU preference % uniquely reveals a set of relevant priors
S
C = P ∈P P , which represents all possible outcomes of the belief-selection game (up to
convex closure and elimination of never-selected beliefs). Sections 4.1–4.2 further discuss the
uniqueness properties and comparative statics of the DSEU model.
Our second contribution is to exploit the structure of the DSEU model to represent and
organize a range of natural intermediate ambiguity attitudes: In line with the aforementioned experimental evidence, these successively relax uncertainty aversion, by accommodating some degree of ambiguity-seeking behavior. The main insight is that, under DSEU,
there is a correspondence between the degree of ambiguity aversion of the DM, as captured
by the strength of her preference for hedging, and the extent of overlap of sets in P, which
measures the relative “power” allocated to Pessimism vs. Optimism in the belief-selection
game. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 formalize this as follows:
First, uncertainty aversion, i.e., a preference for all hedges, corresponds to the extreme
case where the intersection of all sets in P coincides with C. That is, all relevant priors are
available to Pessimism regardless of Optimism’s action, thus rendering Optimism powerless.
Second, we show that allocating more power to Optimism by only requiring the intersection of all sets in P to be nonempty corresponds to Ghirardato and Marinacci’s (2002)
notion of absolute ambiguity aversion: This only imposes a preference for complete hedges,
i.e., for hedges that fully eliminate uncertainty.
Third, we further relax absolute ambiguity aversion, motivated in part by the following
preference pattern that was originally conjectured by Ellsberg (see Ellsberg, 2011) and subsequently confirmed in laboratory experiments (e.g., Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell, and
3

Peijnenburg, 2015; Kocher, Lahno, and Trautmann, 2018):
Example 1 (Ambiguity-seeking for small odds). Consider an urn of unknown composition
containing balls of up to 10 possible colors. A ball is drawn from the urn and its color
observed. When given the choice between receiving $10 if the observed color is one of
five possible colors vs. receiving $10 with probability 0.5, most subjects prefer the objective
lottery, similar to the ambiguity-averse behavior predicted by Ellsberg’s two-color urn experiment. By contrast, when the choice is between receiving $10 if the observed color is a single
possible color vs. receiving $10 with probability 0.1, many subjects strictly prefer the former
bet. That is, many individuals are simultaneously ambiguity-averse for moderate-likelihood
events and ambiguity-seeking for small-likelihood events.
N
To capture this pattern, we introduce the notion of k-ambiguity aversion (for some k =
2, 3, . . .), which weakens absolute ambiguity aversion by imposing a preference for complete
hedges only among any k acts. As we discuss, the evidence in Example 1 is consistent with
k-ambiguity aversion for small k (here, k = 2) but not for large k (here, k = 10). We show
that under DSEU, k-ambiguity aversion is equivalent to the intersection of any k sets in P
being nonempty and, as a result, the model can accommodate this preference pattern.
Finally, even 2-ambiguity aversion must be relaxed to accommodate another important
behavioral pattern:
Example 2 (Source-dependent ambiguity attitudes). One manifestation of home bias (French
and Poterba, 1991; Coval and Moskowitz, 1999) is that many investors are more ambiguityaverse for bets pertaining to the foreign stock market than the domestic stock market; indeed, some investors are found to be ambiguity-averse for foreign investments but ambiguityseeking for domestic investments (Anantanasuwong, Kouwenberg, Mitchell, and Peijnenberg,
2019, see Section 3.2 for more details). More generally, in many settings, individuals appear
ambiguity-averse with respect to unfamiliar sources of uncertainty but ambiguity-seeking with
respect to familiar sources (Heath and Tversky, 1991; Keppe and Weber, 1995).
N
To model such source-dependent ambiguity attitudes, we consider the sign of an eventbased ambiguity aversion index that is commonly used in experimental work (Baillon and
Bleichrodt, 2015; Baillon, Huang, Selim, and Wakker, 2018). We show that under DSEU
the sign of this index is characterized by a “local” version of the binary intersection condition underlying 2-ambiguity aversion. As a result, the model can flexibly accommodate
source-dependent negative and positive ambiguity attitudes. By contrast, we prove that
this phenomenon is incompatible with α-MEU, a special case of DSEU that is often used to
capture a mix of negative and positive ambiguity attitudes in applied work.
4

In Section 3.3, we build on the preceding results and present two applications that highlight some economic implications of intermediate ambiguity attitudes. First, we consider
ambiguity sharing among multiple DSEU-maximizing agents. Using the above representation of absolute ambiguity aversion, we unify and generalize existing “minimal agreement”
conditions for the inefficiency of parimutuel betting (Billot, Chateauneuf, Gilboa, and Tallon, 2000; Chateauneuf, Dana, and Tallon, 2000). Second, using a parametric specification
of DSEU, we solve a single-agent insurance problem and show that further relaxing negative
ambiguity attitudes to k-ambiguity aversion yields a potential explanation for the demand
for partial insurance.

1.2

Related Literature

This paper contributes to the decision-theoretic literature on preferences under ambiguity
(for a survey, see Gilboa and Marinacci, 2016). Our first main result—in particular, the finding that our baseline model, DSEU, represents the class of invariant biseparable preferences—
complements Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) (henceforth GMM) and Amarante (2009). Our second contribution of characterizing intermediate ambiguity attitudes
relies heavily on the structure of DSEU and has no counterpart in these papers.
GMM introduce the class of invariant biseparable preferences and show that every such
preference admits a representation
W (f ) = α(f ) min Eµ [u(f )] + (1 − α(f )) max Eµ [u(f )],
µ∈C

µ∈C

(2)

where α is a function from acts to [0, 1] and C is the set of relevant priors of % (see Section 2.3). Importantly, as GMM point out, the converse of this result does not hold without
further joint restrictions on the model parameters: Specifically, to ensure that the preference
% induced by (2) satisfies certainty independence, the weight function α must be measurable
with respect to a particular equivalence relation derived from u and C;4 moreover, α, C, and
u must be such that % is monotonic (see Remark 2 in GMM).5 Similar to (2), DSEU provides a representation of invariant biseparable preferences that generalizes maxmin expected
4

That is, we must have α(f ) = α(g) whenever f  g, where this equivalence relation is defined by
h
i
f  g ⇐⇒ Eµ [u(f )] ≥ Eν [u(f )] ⇔ Eµ [u(g)] ≥ Eν [u(g)], ∀µ, ν ∈ C .

5

Even when parameters (C, α, u) induce an invariant biseparable preference % via (2), C is not in general
the set of relevant priors of %, as this entails solving a fixed-point problem. For example, when α is constant
and the state space is finite, Eichberger, Grant, Kelsey, and Koshevoy (2011) show that the only cases where
C is the set of relevant priors of the induced preference are maxmin (α = 1) and maxmax (α = 0).
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utility by incorporating a force for optimism, in the form of a max operator, into the DM’s
belief-selection process. However, the invariant biseparable axioms are not only sufficient,
but also necessary for a DSEU representation: That is, in contrast with (2), any combination
of model parameters (P, u) induces an invariant biseparable preference via (1). This is key in
enabling our characterization of intermediate ambiguity attitudes in terms of the structure
of P. Our characterization of comparative ambiguity aversion also moves beyond GMM, in
that it does not require holding fixed the set of relevant priors (see Section 4.2).
Amarante (2009) shows that the invariant biseparable axioms are both sufficient and
necessary for a representation of the form
ˆ
Eµ [u(f )] dν(µ),

W (f ) =

(3)

∆(S)

where ν is a Choquet capacity over beliefs µ ∈ ∆(S). This representation suggests the
complementary interpretation of a robust Bayesian DM who uses a nonadditive prior over
probabilistic models. However, in contrast with our results for DSEU, there are no known
characterizations of absolute and comparative ambiguity attitudes in terms of the model parameters in (3): Notably, unlike for Choquet expected utility (Schmeidler, 1989), uncertainty
aversion (resp., absolute ambiguity aversion) does not imply convexity (resp., non-emptiness
of the core) of ν.
Our characterization of intermediate ambiguity attitudes is also an important difference
from other papers that relax uncertainty aversion, including Schmeidler (1989), Klibanoff,
Marinacci, and Mukerji’s (2005) smooth model, and models of preferences over utility dispersion (e.g., Siniscalchi, 2009; Grant and Polak, 2013): While some of these papers provide
representations of absolute ambiguity aversion, none use their models to characterize weaker
degrees of ambiguity aversion.
Related to the structure of DSEU, several recent papers employ belief-set or utility-set
collections in other contexts. While we maintain the weak order axiom and focus on relaxing
independence, Lehrer and Teper (2011), Nascimento and Riella (2011), Nishimura and Ok
(2016), Hara, Ok, and Riella (2019), and Aguiar, Hjertstrand, and Serrano (2020) study
preferences that violate completeness and/or transitivity.6 Whereas DSEU is a utility representation, these papers provide generalized unanimity representations à la Bewley (2002)
and Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok (2004), and the resulting proof methods are quite different.
In the context of attitudes to randomization under ambiguity, Ke and Zhang (2019) consider
6

See also Kopylov (2019) for an extension of maxmin expected utility that relaxes transitivity by allowing
the set of priors to depend upon the acts under consideration. Mononen (2020) generalizes the DSEU model
(and some of its extensions) by relaxing monotonicity, and shows how to identify subjective probabilities
and state-dependent utilities for the resulting representations.
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preferences over lotteries over acts and propose a representation that adds minimization over
belief-set collections to maxmin expected utility. When restricted to acts (i.e., degenerate
lotteries), their representation is equivalent to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
Beyond the ambiguity literature, representations based on a combination of max and min
operators have been used to provide foundations for maxmin values in zero-sum games (Hart,
Modica, and Schmeidler, 1994), utility aggregation (Chambers, 2007), and coarse reasoning
(Saponara, 2020). These representations can be shown to be strict special cases of DSEU,
suggesting that the DSEU model might serve as a unifying framework to capture additional
phenomena, beyond the focus on ambiguity attitudes in the current paper.
Finally, Theorem 1 relates to recent results in mathematics on the linearization of positively homogeneous functions: These imply that a functional I : RS → R admits a so-called
“Boolean” representation, where I(φ) = maxU ∈U min`∈U ` · φ for some collection U of compact, convex subsets of RS , if and only if I is positively homogeneous, lower semicontinuous,
and locally Lipschitz (see the survey by Rubinov and Dzalilov, 2002). We show that under
the additional assumption that I is monotonic and constant-additive, U can be taken to be
a belief-set collection. More importantly, our construction only makes use of beliefs µ in the
Clarke differential ∂I(0), which represents the DM’s set of relevant priors (see Sections 2.2–
2.3). As we discuss, this requires a different proof approach.

2
2.1

Dual-self expected utility
Setup

Let Z be a set of prizes and let ∆(Z) denote the space of probability measures with finite
support over Z. We refer to typical elements p, q ∈ ∆(Z) as lotteries. Let S be a finite
set of states. An (Anscombe-Aumann) act is a mapping f : S → ∆(Z). Let F be the
space of all acts, with typical elements f, g, h. For any f, g ∈ F and α ∈ [0, 1], define
the mixture αf + (1 − α)g ∈ F to be the act that in each state s ∈ S yields lottery
αf (s) + (1 − α)g(s) ∈ ∆(Z). As usual, we identify each lottery p ∈ ∆(Z) with the constant
act that yields lottery p in each state s ∈ S.
Let ∆(S) denote the set of all probability measures over S, which we embed in RS and
endow with the Euclidean topology. We refer to typical elements µ, ν ∈ ∆(S) as beliefs.
Given any act f ∈ F and map u : ∆(Z) → R, let u(f ) denote the element of RS given by
u(f )(s) = u(f (s)) for all s ∈ S, and let Eµ [u(f )] := µ · u(f ).
The DM’s preference over F is given by a binary relation % on F. As usual,  and ∼
denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of %.
7

2.2

Representation

We now introduce our baseline representation, dual-self expected utility. Let K(∆(S)) denote
the space of all nonempty closed, convex sets of beliefs, endowed with the Hausdorff topology.
A belief-set collection is a nonempty compact collection P ⊆ K(∆(S)); that is, each
element P ∈ P is a nonempty closed, convex set of beliefs.
Definition 1. A dual-self expected utility (DSEU) representation of preference % consists of a belief-set collection P and a nonconstant affine utility u : ∆(Z) → R such that
WDSEU (f ) = max min Eµ [u(f )]
P ∈P µ∈P

(4)

represents %.7
Just as Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) maxmin expected utility model, DSEU is a
multiple-prior model of ambiguity preferences: The DM has in mind a set of relevant beliefs
S
P ∈P P , and might use a different belief to evaluate each act. But unlike maxmin expected
utility, the belief µ used to evaluate any given act f is not necessarily worst-case among
all relevant beliefs. Instead, µ is the outcome of a sequential zero-sum game between two
conflicting forces or “selves:” First, self 1 (“Optimism”) chooses an action P ∈ P with the
goal of maximizing expected utility to act f ; then self 2 (“Pessimism”) chooses an action
µ ∈ P with the goal of minimizing expected utility to f .
Maxmin expected utility is given by the extreme case where Optimism’s action set is
trivial (i.e., P = {P } is a singleton), as in this case (4) reduces to W (f ) = minµ∈P Eµ [u(f )].
Likewise, maxmax expected utility, W (f ) = maxµ∈P Eµ [u(f )], corresponds to the opposite
extreme where Pessimism’s action set is always trivial (i.e., P = {{µ} : µ ∈ P } is a collection
of singletons).
Our first main result is that DSEU represents the class of preferences (known as invariant
biseparable) that satisfy all subjective expected utility axioms, except that independence is
relaxed to certainty independence:
Axiom 1 (Weak Order). % is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2 (Monotonicity). If f, g ∈ F and f (s) % g(s) for all s ∈ S, then f % g.
Axiom 3 (Nondegeneracy). There exist f, g ∈ F such that f  g.
Axiom 4 (Archimedean). For all f, g, h ∈ F with f  g  h, there exist α, β ∈ (0, 1) such
that
αf + (1 − α)h  g  βf + (1 − β)h.
7

The functional (4) is well-defined since P is nonempty and compact.
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Axiom 5 (Certainty Independence). For all f, g ∈ F, p ∈ ∆(Z), and α ∈ (0, 1],
f % g ⇐⇒ αf + (1 − α)p % αg + (1 − α)p.
Theorem 1. Preference % satisfies Axioms 1–5 if and only if % admits a DSEU representation.
Thus, like maxmin expected utility, DSEU captures the possible presence of ambiguity
by imposing independence only for mixtures with constant acts (Axiom 5). However, unlike
maxmin expected utility, DSEU does not additionally impose uncertainty aversion, which
reflects a negative attitude toward ambiguity through a preference for hedging (see Axiom 6).
Certainty independence is weak enough to allow the model to nest important special cases
such as Choquet expected utility and α-MEU.8 However, Section 4.3 will show that natural generalizations of DSEU represent classes of preferences that further relax certainty
independence.
We prove Theorem 1 in Appendix B.1. We first invoke the well-known fact that % satisfies
Axioms 1–5 if and only if % can be represented by I ◦ u for some nonconstant affine utility
u and a functional I : RS → R that is monotonic, positively homogeneous, and constantadditive (Appendix A.1 defines these terms). For the sufficiency direction of the proof, we
then make use of the Clarke differential ∂I(0) ⊆ ∆(S) of I at the constant vector 0 (Clarke,
1990, see Appendix A.2). The key step is to show that the belief-set collection P∗ given by
P∗ := cl{Pφ∗ : φ ∈ RS } with Pφ∗ := {µ ∈ ∂I(0) : Eµ [φ] ≥ I(φ)}

(5)

yields a DSEU representation of I, i.e., for all φ ∈ RS ,
I(φ) = max∗ min Eµ [φ].
P ∈P µ∈P

(6)

Our proof builds partly on a non-smooth generalization of results in Ovchinnikov (2001).
Remark 1. (i) General action sets. The specific form of action sets for Optimism and
Pessimism in (4) is without loss of generality. Indeed, % admits a DSEU representation with
utility u if and only if there exist arbitrary action sets A1 , A2 and a mapping µ : A1 × A2 →
∆(S) from action profiles to beliefs such that
W (f ) = max min Eµ(a1 ,a2 ) [u(f )]
a1 ∈A1 a2 ∈A2

8

(7)

See also Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2005), who argue why certainty independence is important for achieving a separation of tastes and beliefs.
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is well-defined and represents %.9
(ii) Min-max form. While DSEU takes the max-min form, where Optimism moves first,
a natural alternative is to consider games where Pessimism is the first mover, as captured
by the functional W (f ) = minQ∈Q maxµ∈Q Eµ [u(f )] for some belief-set collection Q. It can
be shown that the latter class of representations is equivalent to DSEU, in the sense that
preference % admits a DSEU representation (P, u) if and only if % admits a representation
(Q, u) of the min-max form for some belief-set collection Q. However, for a given preference
%, Q need not coincide with P in general. See Supplementary Appendix S.2 for details.
(iii) Single-self interpretation. In addition to the dual-self interpretation above, DSEU
admits a single-self interpretation, whereby the DM optimally selects her own ambiguity
preference from a feasible set.10 Specifically, feasible ambiguity preferences take the maxmin
expected utility form minµ∈P Eµ [u(f )] and depending on f , the DM optimally controls the
parameter P , where P represents the constraints of the subjective optimization.
N

2.3

Relevant Priors

A natural way to identify the DM’s set of relevant priors under DSEU is to consider the
S
union P ∈P P of all sets in the belief-set collection. This captures all possible outcomes of
the belief-selection game between Optimism and Pessimism. To eliminate redundant beliefs
that are never selected, we focus on the smallest closed, convex set of beliefs that can arise
under any DSEU representation. Proposition 1 shows that this set is uniquely identified:
Proposition 1. Suppose % satisfies Axioms 1–5. There exists a unique closed, convex set
C ⊆ ∆(S) such that
[
P
(8)
C ⊆ co
P ∈P

for all DSEU representations (P, u) of % and such that (8) holds with equality for some
(P, u).
We call a DSEU representation tight if (8) holds with equality. To prove Proposition 1
S
(Appendix B.2), we show that for any DSEU representation, co P ∈P P includes the Clarke
differential ∂I(0) at 0 of the functional I from the proof of Theorem 1. Since the represenS
tation P∗ in (5) satisfies co P ∈P∗ P = ∂I(0), this implies that the set of relevant priors C is
precisely ∂I(0) and that P∗ is a tight representation.
9

ToQsee this, suppose (P, u) is a DSEU representation of %. Then (7) represents % with A1 := P,
A2 := P ∈P P , and µ(P, σ) := σ(P ) for all P ∈ A1 , σ ∈ A2 . Conversely, suppose (7) represents % for some
(A1 , A2 , µ, u). Then setting P := cl{co(µ(a1 , A2 )) : a1 ∈ A1 } yields a DSEU representation of %.
10
See Sarver (2018) for an analogous model in the context of risk preferences.
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An implication of this Clarke-differential characterization of C is that our definition of the
DM’s relevant priors as the possible outcomes of the belief-selection game is equivalent to the
following behavioral definition due to GMM, which is based on quantifying departures from
independence. For any preference % satisfying Axioms 1–5, GMM define the unambiguous
preference %∗ as the largest independent subrelation of %; equivalently, f %∗ g means that
αf + (1 − α)h % αg + (1 − α)h holds for all α ∈ (0, 1] and h ∈ F.
Note that %∗ is incomplete whenever % violates independence. GMM show that %∗
admits a unanimity representation à la Bewley (2002) and identify the unique closed, convex
set of priors in the unanimity representation as the DM’s relevant set of priors.11 Since GMM
show that the latter set again coincides with ∂I(0), we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 1. If % admits a DSEU representation with utility u, then the set of relevant
priors C is the unique closed, convex set such that
f %∗ g ⇐⇒ Eµ [u(f )] ≥ Eµ [u(g)] for all µ ∈ C.

3

(9)

Intermediate ambiguity attitudes

In this section, we exploit the structure of the DSEU model to represent and organize a
range of intermediate attitudes toward ambiguity. Our results can capture various ways in
which a DM might display a mix of ambiguity-averse and ambiguity-seeking tendencies. We
discuss the relevance of these results both for accommodating experimental evidence and for
generating new economic predictions.

3.1

Shades of ambiguity aversion

We first show how DSEU can represent a range of different shades of ambiguity aversion that
vary in the degree to which they impose a preference for hedging. First, Schmeidler’s (1989)
seminal uncertainty aversion axiom postulates that the DM always takes up an opportunity
to hedge between two equally valued prospects:
Axiom 6 (Uncertainty Aversion). If f, g ∈ F with f ∼ g, then

1
1
f + g % f.
2
2

A second common definition of ambiguity aversion is due to Ghirardato and Marinacci
(2002): Recall the standard comparative notion of ambiguity aversion, whereby %1 is more
Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler (2010) take an alternative approach by including %∗
as part of the primitive. Ghirardato and Siniscalchi (2012) extend GMM’s characterization of relevant
priors beyond the invariant biseparable class. See Klibanoff, Mukerji, and Seo (2014) for a discussion of the
interpretation of C.
11

11

ambiguity-averse than %2 if, whenever f %1 p for some f ∈ F and p ∈ ∆(Z), then f %2 p.
Analogous to the definition of absolutely risk-averse as more risk-averse than a risk-neutral
preference, % is said to be absolutely ambiguity-averse if it is more ambiguity-averse
than some nondegenerate subjective expected utility preference.12
We contrast these two formalizations of ambiguity aversion with the following third notion:
Axiom 7 (k-Ambiguity Aversion). For all f1 , ..., fk ∈ F with f1 ∼ f2 ∼ · · · ∼ fk and any
p ∈ ∆(Z),
1
1
f1 + · · · + fk = p =⇒ p % f1 .
k
k
Axiom 7 only imposes a preference for complete hedging between k equally valued
prospects, that is, for hedges that eliminate subjective uncertainty entirely. To see the
relationship with absolute ambiguity aversion, say that % satisfies ∞-ambiguity aversion
if it satisfies k-ambiguity aversion for all k. This corresponds to the notion of preference for
sure diversification used by Chateauneuf and Tallon (2002) to characterize absolute ambiguity aversion under Choquet expected utility. Arguments in Grant and Polak (2013) imply
that this characterization extends to DSEU; moreover, we note that |S|-ambiguity aversion
is sufficient for ∞-ambiguity aversion (where |S| is the cardinality of the state space):
Lemma 1. Suppose % admits a DSEU representation. The following are equivalent: (i)
% is absolutely ambiguity-averse; (ii) % satisfies ∞-ambiguity aversion; (iii) % satisfies
|S|-ambiguity aversion.
The following result shows that under DSEU, the above notions of ambiguity aversion
are characterized by the degree of overlap of sets in P:
Theorem 2. Suppose that % admits a DSEU representation (P, u). Then:
\
1. % satisfies uncertainty aversion if and only if
P = C;
P ∈P

2. % is absolutely ambiguity-averse if and only if

\

P 6= ∅;

P ∈P

3. % satisfies k-ambiguity aversion if and only if

\

Pi 6= ∅ for all P1 , ..., Pk ∈ P.

i=1,...,k

Conditions 1–3 capture a natural sense in which these notions of ambiguity aversion allocate successively less relative “power” to Pessimism in the belief-selection game represented
12

See Epstein (1999) for another approach that takes as its benchmark probabilistic sophistication instead
of subjective expected utility.
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by (P, u), where “power” is measured by the extent of overlap of sets in P. The first two conT
ditions consider the intersection P ∈P P of all sets in P, which we note is uniquely identified
from the preference %.
Specifically, uncertainty aversion corresponds to the maximal allocation of power to PesT
simism: Since P ∈P P = C, all relevant priors µ ∈ C are available to Pessimism, no matter
which set P ∈ P Optimism chooses. The game thus boils down to Pessimism choosing a
belief µ ∈ C, yielding maxmin expected utility; indeed, note that if (P, u) is tight, then %
satisfies uncertainty aversion if and only if P = {C}.
Absolute ambiguity aversion allocates less power to Pessimism, requiring only that there
T
is some prior µ ∈ P ∈P P that is always available to Pessimism regardless of Optimism’s
choice. As a result, the DM’s valuation of any act f is bounded above by the expected
utility Eµ [u(f )] of f under prior µ. In the special case when % admits a Choquet expected
T
utility representation with capacity ν, we note that P ∈P P coincides with the core of ν;
thus, our nonempty intersection condition generalizes the fact that under Choquet expected
utility, absolute ambiguity aversion is characterized by the nonemptiness of the core of ν.
In Section 3.3.1, we obtain a condition for ambiguity sharing in markets that extends this
nonempty intersection condition to multiple agents.
Finally, while absolute ambiguity aversion requires the intersection of all sets in P to be
nonempty, k-ambiguity aversion imposes this only for any k sets in P. In other words, for any
T
k actions P1 , · · · , Pk available to Optimism, there is at least one prior µ ∈ i=1,··· ,k Pi that
Pessimism can choose in response to all of these actions. Thus, k-ambiguity aversion further
decreases the power allocated to Pessimism, and more so the smaller k. As highlighted in
the introduction, one motivation for relaxing the DM’s negative ambiguity attitude in this
manner is experimental evidence on ambiguity-seeking for small odds:
Example 3 (Ambiguity-seeking for small odds—continued). To formalize the relationship
with Example 1, let the state space S = {1, . . . , 10} represent the observed color, let fE
denote the uncertain bet that pays $10 if the observed color belongs to E ⊆ S and $0
otherwise, and let pα denote the objective lottery that pays $10 with probability α and $0
otherwise. When the cardinality of E is 5, subjects’ reported preference for the objective
lottery p0.5 over the uncertain bet fE is consistent with 2-ambiguity aversion. However,
assume that, by symmetry, subjects are indifferent between betting on any single color, i.e.,
f{1} ∼ . . . ∼ f{10} . Then the commonly reported strict preference for any f{s} over p0.1 is
1
1
N
inconsistent with 10-ambiguity aversion, as p0.1 = f{1} + · · · f{10} .
10
10
Based on Theorem 2, we can show that DSEU allows for flexible degrees of k-ambiguity
aversion, and hence can accommodate the evidence in Example 1. This contrasts, for in13

stance, with Siniscalchi’s (2009) vector expected utility model, which also relaxes uncertainty
aversion, but for which 2-ambiguity aversion and ∞-ambiguity aversion are equivalent.13 As
a simple example, consider the following parametrization of DSEU: Fix any π ∈ ∆(S) and
ε ∈ R with 0 ≤ πs − ε ≤ 1 for all s. Then consider the representation (P, u) of the form
P = {Ps : s ∈ S}, where for each s,
Ps := {µ ∈ ∆(S) : µ(s) ≥ πs − ε}.

(10)

For each k ≤ |S|, Theorem 2 implies that k-ambiguity aversion is satisfied if and only if
ε ≥ (πs1 + · · · + πsk − 1)/k for all distinct s1 , · · · , sk ∈ S.14 In particular, the maximal degree
of k-ambiguity aversion of the induced preference is non-decreasing in ε, and the preference is absolutely ambiguity-averse if and only if ε ≥ 0. Moving beyond urn experiments,
Section 3.3.2 will use this parametrization to highlight some implications of k-ambiguity
aversion for optimal insurance coverage.
Remark 2. One can also exploit the structure of DSEU to represent other natural relaxations of uncertainty aversion. For example, the special case of DSEU where the belief-set
collection P is finite is characterized by a weak form of uncertainty aversion, which imposes a
preference for hedging only among acts f and g whose payoffs in all states are close enough.
See Theorem 1 in the working paper version of Chandrasekher (2019).
N

3.2

Source-dependent ambiguity attitudes

While the preceding notions of ambiguity aversion are “global,” capturing the DM’s attitude
towards any uncertainty that can be generated in S, the experimental literature commonly
takes a “local” approach, measuring the DM’s ambiguity attitude relative to specific events
or sources of uncertainty. As discussed in the introduction, an important finding is that a
DM might display source-dependent negative and positive ambiguity attitudes, depending on
whether she considers herself familiar or unfamiliar with a given source of uncertainty.
To formalize this idea, we use a local index of ambiguity attitude that was originally
proposed by Schmeidler (1989) and subsequently employed in both theoretical work (Dow
13

Note that 2-ambiguity aversion is equivalent to Siniscalchi’s (2009) Axiom 11, which he shows is equivalent to absolute ambiguity aversion (provided utilities are unbounded). Dillenberger and Segal (2017) show
that a version of Segal’s (1987) model is consistent with ambiguity-seeking for small odds.
14
Indeed, suppose ε ≥ (πs1 +· · ·+πsk −1)/k for all distinct s1 , · · · , sk . Then for any s1 , · · · , sk , consider the
belief µ such that µ(si ) = πsi − ε for all i = 1, · · · , k, and the remaining weight 1 − kε − πs1 − · · · − πsk (which
is nonnegative) is allocated uniformly across the other states. We have µ ∈ ∩ki=1 Psi . Thus, k-ambiguity
Tk
aversion holds. Conversely, suppose ε < (πs1 + · · · + πsk − 1)/k for some s1 , · · · , sk . Then any µ ∈ i=1 Psi
Tk
would satisfy µ(s1 ) + · · · + µ(sk ) ≥ πs1 + · · · + πsk − kε > 1, which is impossible. Thus, i=1 Psi = ∅.
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and Werlang, 1992) and experiments. One advantage of this index is that it can be defined for
any event, without imposing symmetry on the state space as is common in urn experiments.
Definition 2. The matching probability m(E) ∈ [0, 1] of an event E is defined by the
indifference condition
xE y ∼ m(E)δx + (1 − m(E))δy ,
where x, y ∈ Z are two outcomes such that δx  δy and xE y denotes the binary act that
yields x for all s ∈ E and y otherwise.15 The ambiguity aversion index of E is
AA(E) := 1 − m(E) − m(E c ).

(11)

Whereas subjective expected utility implies AA(E) = 0 for all E, AA(E) > 0 (resp.
AA(E) < 0) is interpreted as a negative (resp. positive) attitude to ambiguity associated with
E. In particular, the aforementioned evidence suggests that a DM might display AA(E) > 0
when E is conditioned on an unfamiliar source of uncertainty, but might display AA(E) < 0
when she feels particularly competent about the relevant source:
Example 4 (Source-dependent ambiguity attitudes—continued). As a stylized formalization of Example 2, let SH = {U, D} be a state space specifying whether the domestic stock
market goes up (“U”) or down (“D”). Similarly, let SF = {U, D} describe the state of the
stock market in a foreign country. Consider the product state space S = SH × SF , and let
EH = {U U, U D} be the event that the domestic stock market goes up, and EF = {U U, DU }
be the corresponding event for the foreign stock market. The evidence in Anantanasuwong, Kouwenberg, Mitchell, and Peijnenberg (2019) suggests that some investors display
AA(EF ) > 0 > AA(EH ).16 Similarly, in an experiment involving German subjects, Keppe
and Weber (1995) find that the average ambiguity index is positive for bets concerning US
geography, but negative for bets concerning German geography.
N
To see how DSEU can capture this evidence, we note that the sign of AA(E) is characterized by the following local analog of the binary intersection condition for 2-ambiguity
aversion in Theorem 2. Given an event E and set of beliefs P , let PE := {µ(E) : µ ∈ P }.
Proposition 2. Suppose % admits a DSEU representation (P, u), and let E be any subset
of S. Then:
15

Under Axioms 1–5, m(·) is well-defined independent of the choice of x, y.
Anantanasuwong, Kouwenberg, Mitchell, and Peijnenberg (2019) conduct an incentivized field survey
among investors and find reversals in ambiguity attitudes as in Example 4, where H and F correspond to a
domestic and foreign stock market index (see Figures 4 and 5). They also find a higher population average
AA index for EF than EH , but the difference is relatively small, as some investors display the opposite
reversal (which can also be accommodated by DSEU).
16

15

1. AA(E) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ PE ∩ PE0 6= ∅ for all P, P 0 ∈ P;
2. AA(E) > 0 ⇐⇒ PE ∩ PE0 is a non-degenerate interval for all P, P 0 ∈ P.
Thus, while 2-ambiguity aversion implies that AA(E) ≥ 0 for all events E, further
limiting the overlap of sets in P can accommodate the behavior in Example 4. Indeed,
the following result shows that DSEU can capture source-dependent negative and positive
ambiguity attitudes with respect to any families E and F of unfamiliar and familiar events:17
Corollary 2. Fix any disjoint collections E and F of events, both of which are closed under
complements and do not contain S. There exists a DSEU representation (P, u) whose induced
preference satisfies AA(E) > 0 > AA(F ) for all E ∈ E, F ∈ F.
Corollary 2 contrasts with a prominent special case of DSEU, the α-MEU model. This
is given by the functional
W (f ) = α min Eµ [u(f )] + (1 − α) max Eµ [u(f )]
µ∈P

µ∈P

(12)

for some α ∈ [0, 1], nonempty closed, convex set of beliefs P , and nonconstant affine u.
While the α-MEU model is widely used in applied work to capture a mix of negative and
positive ambiguity attitudes, the following result shows that it is incompatible with the
source-dependent variation in ambiguity attitudes formalized above. Indeed, observe that
(12) coincides with the DSEU representation (P, u) where P = {αP + (1 − α){µ} : µ ∈ P }.
Then Proposition 2 implies that the sign of the ambiguity aversion index is the same for all
events and is determined by the value of α:
Corollary 3. Suppose % admits an α-MEU representation where P is not a singleton. Then
α ≥ 1/2 (resp. α ≤ 1/2) if and only if AA(E) ≥ 0 (resp. AA(E) ≤ 0) for all E.
Finally, these insights extend to another common formalization of source dependence
(along the lines of experimental work by, e.g., Tversky and Fox, 1995; Heath and Tversky,
1991) that does not involve matching probabilities. As before, fix two outcomes x, y ∈ Z
such that δx  δy . Consider the preference pattern
xE y  xF y  xG y

and

17

xE c y  xF c y  xGc y,

(13)

Several papers (e.g., Nau, 2006; Chew and Sagi, 2008; Ergin and Gul, 2009; Gul and Pesendorfer,
2015; Cappelli, Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Minardi, 2016) propose formalizations of source
dependence based on the idea that the DM is probabilistically sophisticated over prospects that depend on a
single common source, but exhibits varying attitudes toward uncertainty across sources. Corollary 2 considers
a specific variation where the DM exhibits negative vs. positive attitudes depending on her familiarity with
each source. See also Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido, and Wakker (2011); Chew, Miao, and Zhong (2018) for
experimental work using different notions of source dependence.
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where event F is unambiguous, in the sense that f ∼ xF y ⇒ λf + (1 − λ)xF y ∼ xF y
for all λ ∈ (0, 1).18 In (13), the DM’s preference to bet on both F vs. G and F c vs. Gc
captures a negative attitude towards the uncertainty underlying event G. At the same time,
the preference for betting on E vs. F and E c vs. F c reflects a positive attitude towards the
uncertainty underlying event E. It is easy to see that (13) implies AA(E) < AA(F ) = 0 <
AA(G). Thus, it is immediate from Corollary 3 that this form of source dependence is also
inconsistent with α-MEU, while it is again compatible with the general DSEU model:
Corollary 4. Suppose % admits an α-MEU representation. Then there do not exist events
E, F , G, where F is unambiguous, such that (13) is satisfied.
Supplementary Appendix S.3 derives a similar incompatibility result to Corollary 4 for
Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji’s (2005) smooth model.

3.3

Applications

We conclude this section with two applications that highlight some economic implications
of intermediate ambiguity attitudes, building on the preceding characterizations of such
attitudes.
3.3.1

Ambiguity sharing

First, we consider ambiguity sharing among multiple DSEU-maximizing agents. There is a
finite set I of agents and a single good (e.g., money). Each agent i’s preference over statedependent consumption bundles xi ∈ RS+ admits a DSEU representation (Pi , ui ), where all
beliefs in Pi have full support and the consumption utility ui : R+ → R is strictly increasing
and strictly concave. Each i’s initial endowment is ωi ∈ RS+ , and the economy features no
P
aggregate uncertainty, i.e., for some w > 0, i ωi (s) = w for all s. A feasible allocation
P
is a profile x = (xi )i∈I ∈ RS×I
such that i xi (s) = w for each s. An allocation is full
+
insurance if each xi is constant across states s.
A classic literature asks when it is Pareto efficient for agents to bet against each other (i.e.,
to engage in trade that does not yield a full insurance allocation). Under subjective expected
utility, betting is efficient if and only if there is some disagreement among the agents, meaning
that they don’t all share the same prior belief. This stark result raises the question why
we don’t see more parimutuel betting in everyday life, where opportunities for disagreement
are widespread. The literature has proposed ambiguity aversion as a natural explanation
18

Under DSEU, this is equivalent to the condition that xF y is crisp as defined by GMM, which is in turn
equivalent to requiring µ(F ) to be constant across all beliefs µ ∈ C (Proposition 10 in GMM).
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for the avoidance of such bets. Indeed, under maxmin expected utility, Billot, Chateauneuf,
Gilboa, and Tallon (2000) show that all efficient allocations are full insurance as long as
the intersection of all agents’ sets of beliefs is nonempty; that is, if agents are uncertaintyaverse, some minimal agreement, as opposed to full agreement, is sufficient to guarantee the
optimality of full insurance. Chateauneuf, Dana, and Tallon (2000) prove a similar result for
Choquet expected utility maximizers under the condition that the intersection of the cores
of agents’ capacities is nonempty.
Using the structure of DSEU, we can unify and generalize these two results by obtaining
a minimal agreement condition for the case of absolutely ambiguity-averse agents.19 By TheT
orem 2, agents are absolutely ambiguity-averse if and only if the sets Pi ∈Pi Pi are nonempty
for all i. The minimal agreement condition we propose requires the intersection of these sets
across all agents to be nonempty. Under this condition, all efficient allocations are again full
insurance; moreover, full insurance can be achieved through a market mechanism (despite
the fact that preferences are not assumed convex):
Proposition 3. Assume that

T

i∈I,Pi ∈Pi

Pi is nonempty. Then:

1. Any feasible allocation x is Pareto efficient if and only if x is full insurance.
2. There exists a competitive equilibrium that features full insurance.
Under maxmin expected utility, Billot, Chateauneuf, Gilboa, and Tallon (2000) also
T
prove a converse of Proposition 3; that is, if i∈I Pi is empty, then full insurance is strictly
dominated by betting. However, the latter result does not hold in general for invariant
biseparable preferences: For instance, Billot, Chateauneuf, Gilboa, and Tallon (2002) provide
a counterexample under Choquet expected utility (see their Example 2).
3.3.2

Insurance choice

Second, we apply the DSEU model to a single-agent insurance problem and illustrate that
further relaxing negative ambiguity attitudes to k-ambiguity aversion can provide a rationale
for the demand for partial insurance. A DM with initial wealth w faces a potential loss. The
size of the loss is uncertain and equals ls in state s, with l1 = 0 < l2 < · · · < lS < w.
19
Proposition 3 generalizes Chateauneuf, Dana, and Tallon (2000), because,
T as noted following Theorem 2,
if %i admits a Choquet representation with capacity νi , then core(νi ) = Pi ∈Pi Pi . Rigotti, Shannon, and
Strzalecki (2008) and Ghirardato and Siniscalchi (2018) generalize Billot, Chateauneuf, Gilboa, and Tallon
(2000) to an abstract class of preferences, using notions of “subjective beliefs” to express minimal agreement.
Proposition 3 does not follow from their results, as their assumptions—strictly convex preferences in Rigotti,
Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008), differential quasiconcavity at certainty (DQC) in Ghirardato and Siniscalchi
(2018)—imply that agents are maxmin expected utility maximizers in our setting. Note that DQC is required
for Ghirardato and Siniscalchi’s (2018) result to apply under any strictly increasing and strictly concave u.
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An insurance policy is characterized by a premium p and a claim schedule c = (c1 , · · · , cS )
with 0 ≤ cs ≤ ls for all s. Let C denote the set of claim schedules. We assume that the
premium associated with c is p(c) := Eπ [c], where π ∈ ∆(S) has full support. A possible
foundation for this assumption is that insurers are ambiguity-neutral and risk-neutral and
attach probability πs to each state s, in which case p(c) is the actuarially fair premium. We
also assume that π1 ≥ πs for all s, capturing that the likelihood of positive losses is small.
The DM is a DSEU maximizer who selects among insurance policies by solving
max min Eµ [u(w − p(c) − l + c)],

c∈C,P ∈P µ∈P

(14)

for some increasing, continuously differentiable, and strictly concave utility u over money.
As is well-known, under the subjective expected utility preference %π with belief π, the DM
chooses to fully insure, i.e., cs = ls for all s. As a result, full insurance is also optimal for
any absolutely ambiguity-averse DM who is more ambiguity-averse than %π .
The following proposition considers instead the parametrization of DSEU in (10), where
for some ε ∈ R with 0 ≤ πs − ε ≤ 1 for all s, the belief-set collection P consists of the
sets Ps := {µ ∈ ∆(S) : µ(s) ≥ πs − ε} for all s. We show that (14) continues to admit a
tractable solution. Notably, full insurance is optimal if and only if the DM is absolutely
ambiguity-averse (i.e., ε ≥ 0): Any DM who is not absolutely ambiguity-averse (i.e., whose
degree of k-ambiguity aversion is less than |S|) retains a positive share of the risk.
Proposition 4. The optimal schedule is unique and has a straight deductible: There exists a
unique d ≥ 0 such that cs = max{ls −d, 0} for all s. The optimal deductible d is nonincreasing
in ε (and hence in the degree of k-ambiguity aversion). Moreover, d = 0 (full insurance) is
optimal if and only if ε ≥ 0.
The optimality of a positive straight deductible is a common finding in standard models
of insurance. However, under expected utility, this finding requires additional forces, such
as transaction costs (Arrow, 1971) or moral hazard (Hölmstrom, 1979), as otherwise full
insurance is optimal.20 Proposition 4 highlights that, under DSEU, intermediate ambiguity
attitudes provide another explanation for the optimality of partial insurance: As long as the
DM is not absolutely ambiguity-averse, she might prefer to take on some risk even if premia
are actuarially fair. The optimal schedule balances the ambiguity-averse and ambiguityseeking tendencies of the DM, by insuring her against large losses but leaving her exposed
to small losses.
20

For instance, in the presence of transaction costs, a positive deductible achieves the best compromise
between risk aversion and the willingness to reduce the deadweight loss from insurance. Alary, Gollier,
and Treich (2013) extend this result to the smooth ambiguity model, under additional assumptions on the
structure of ambiguity. In their model, the optimal deductible is again zero absent transaction costs.

19

4

Discussion and extensions

In this section, we briefly discuss the uniqueness properties and comparative statics of DSEU
representations. We also show how relaxing certainty independence leads to natural generalizations of DSEU.

4.1

Uniqueness

While our results in the preceding sections apply to all DSEU representations (P, u) of a
given preference %, we briefly comment on the uniqueness properties of these representations.
As shown in Proposition 1, % uniquely identifies the DM’s set of relevant priors C. At the
same time, the DM’s belief-set collection P is not in general unique, analogous to other
representations involving belief-set or utility-set collections.21
However, the following result shows how any two DSEU representations (P, u) and (P0 , u0 )
of the same preference are related: The utilities must coincide up to some positive affine
transformation (denoted u ≈ u0 ), and the belief-set collections must coincide up to replacing
all sets of beliefs in P and P0 with the closed half-spaces that contain them. Formally, given
any belief-set collection P, define its half-space closure by
P := cl{H ⊆ ∆(S) : H is a closed half-space in ∆(S) and H ⊇ P for some P ∈ P},
where we call H a closed half-space in ∆(S) if H = Hφ,λ := {µ ∈ ∆(S) : µ · φ ≥ λ} for some
φ ∈ RS and λ ∈ R.
Proposition 5. Suppose (P, u) is a DSEU representation of %. Then (P, u) is also a DSEU
representation of %. Moreover, for any belief-set collection P0 and utility u0 , (P0 , u0 ) is a
DSEU representation of % if and only if P = P0 and u ≈ u0 .
The uniqueness of u up to positive affine transformation is standard. The uniqueness of P
up to half-space closure parallels the identification result in Hara, Ok, and Riella (2019), who
represent independent (but possibly incomplete and intransitive) preferences over lotteries
using a collection of utility-sets. Analogous to Hara, Ok, and Riella (2019), the idea is that
for any P ∈ P, the closed half-spaces containing P capture all information about P that is
relevant to the representation. Indeed, in determining how any given utility act φ ∈ RS is
evaluated by the representation, the only relevant feature of P is the worst-case expectation
21

One might conjecture that % admits a unique representation P̃ that is minimal, in the sense that it
features no redundant actions for Optimism or Pessimism (formally, P̃ is minimal if there is no alternative
representation P 6= P̃ with either (i) P ⊆ P̃ or (ii) ∀P̃ ∈ P̃, ∃P ∈ P with P ⊆ P̃ ). However, this conjecture is
not valid, as some preferences admit multiple minimal representations.
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λP,φ := minµ∈P Eµ [φ], and this worst-case expectation is shared by the closed half-space
Hφ,λP,φ ⊇ P . Thus, replacing each set P in P with the closed half-spaces Hφ,λP,φ for all
φ ∈ RS yields an alternative DSEU representation of %. In Appendix D.1, we express the
half-space closure P as a function of the utility act functional I associated with % (see the
proof of Theorem 1). Because I is uniquely determined by %, this shows that the half-space
closures of all representations of % must coincide.

4.2

Comparative ambiguity attitudes

Next, building on Proposition 5, we provide a representation under DSEU of the standard
comparative notion of ambiguity aversion defined in Section 3.1:
Proposition 6. Suppose %1 and %2 admit DSEU representations (P1 , u1 ) and (P2 , u2 ), respectively. The following are equivalent:
1. %1 is more ambiguity-averse than %2 .
2. u1 ≈ u2 and P1 ⊆ P2 .
To interpret, note that P1 ⊆ P2 means that Optimism’s action set, and hence Optimism’s
ability to influence the DM’s belief, is more limited under representation P1 than under P2 .
Thus, more ambiguity aversion corresponds (up to taking half-space closures) to DSEU
representations that allocate less relative “power” to Optimism. This comparative notion of
power is consistent with the absolute measures in Section 3.1, because P1 ⊆ P2 implies that
T
T
P1 ∈P1 P1 ⊇
P2 ∈P2 P2 and that %1 displays a weakly higher degree of k-ambiguity aversion
than %2 .
In contrast with GMM’s characterization of comparative ambiguity aversion, which only
applies when the sets of relevant priors C1 and C2 associated with %1 and %2 are equal
(Proposition 12 in GMM), Proposition 6 does not assume any relationship between C1 and
C2 . Indeed, there are natural cases in which one invariant biseparable preference is more
ambiguity-averse than another, despite the fact that their sets of priors do not coincide (nor
are nested). For example, as long as C1 ∩C2 6= ∅, then for any u, the maxmin expected utility
preference %1 induced by C1 is more ambiguity-averse than the maxmax expected utility
preference %2 induced by C2 , and the subjective expected utility preference corresponding
to any µ ∈ C1 ∩ C2 is less ambiguity-averse than %1 but more ambiguity-averse than %2 .

4.3

Generalizations

As we have seen, our baseline model, DSEU, corresponds to a relaxation of subjective expected utility where independence is weakened to certainty independence and, equivalently,
21

to dropping uncertainty aversion from Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) axioms. The representation adds a maximization stage into Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) model, suggesting
an interpretation in terms of a game between Optimism and Pessimism.
We highlight that this dual-self approach extends beyond certainty independence, yielding
intuitive representations that further relax independence but still allow for a flexible mix of
negative and positive ambiguity attitudes. To illustrate, consider the following two common
relaxations of certainty independence. First, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini’s (2006)
(henceforth MMR’s) “variational” preferences generalize Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) by
replacing certainty independence with weak certainty independence. This axiom retains
the “location invariance” property implied by certainty independence but relaxes the “scale
invariance” property; we refer the reader to MMR for a detailed discussion:
Axiom 8 (Weak Certainty Independence). For any f, g ∈ F, p, q ∈ ∆(Z), and α ∈ (0, 1),
αf + (1 − α)p % αg + (1 − α)p =⇒ αf + (1 − α)q % αg + (1 − α)q.
Second, Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio’s (2011) (henceforth
CMMM’s) model of “uncertainty-averse” preferences imposes an even weaker form of independence that only holds for objective lotteries:
Axiom 9 (Risk Independence). For any p, q, r ∈ ∆(Z) and α ∈ (0, 1),
p % q =⇒ αp + (1 − α)r % αq + (1 − α)r.
While MMR and CMMM maintain uncertainty aversion, the following two results show
that dropping uncertainty aversion from their axioms yields dual-self representations that
extend DSEU to more general games between Optimism and Pessimism:
Theorem 3. Preference % satisfies Axioms 1–4 and Axiom 8 if and only if % admits
a dual-self variational representation; that is, there exists a nonconstant affine utility
u : ∆(Z) → R and a collection C of convex cost functions c : ∆(S) → R ∪ {∞} with
maxc∈C minµ∈∆(S) c(µ) = 0 such that
W (f ) := max min Eµ [u(f )] + c(µ)
c∈C µ∈∆(S)

(15)

is well-defined and represents %.
In (15), Optimism first chooses a cost function c : ∆(S) → R ∪ {∞} from some collection
C, and Pessimism then chooses a belief subject to this cost. This model adds a maximization
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stage into MMR’s variational representation, which corresponds to the special case in which
C is a singleton.22 Likewise, the following representation incorporates a maximization stage
into CMMM’s representation:23
Theorem 4. Preference % satisfies Axioms 1–4 and Axiom 9 if and only if % admits a rational dual-self representation; that is, there exists a nonconstant affine utility u : ∆(Z) → R
and a collection G of quasiconvex functions G : R × ∆(S) → R ∪ {∞} that are increasing in
their first argument and satisfy maxG∈G inf µ∈∆(S) G(a, µ) = a for all a such that
W (f ) := max inf G(Eµ [u(f )], µ)
G∈G µ∈∆(S)

(16)

is well-defined, continuous, and represents %.
The generalizations of DSEU in Theorems 3 and 4 can accommodate additional experimental evidence. For instance, by relaxing the positive homogeneity of I implied by
certainty independence but preserving constant-additivity, the dual-self variational model
can accommodate Machina’s (2009) paradoxes (see also Baillon, L’Haridon, and Placido,
2011).24 Another important finding is that ambiguity attitudes can differ for gains and
losses: For example, in urn experiments subjects who are ambiguity-averse for bets with
positive payoffs are often ambiguity-seeking when the sign of the bet is reversed (Trautmann
and Wakker, 2018). This is inconsistent with any model that displays constant-additivity,
but can be accommodated by the rational dual-self representation in (16).

Appendix: Proofs
This appendix presents the proofs of all results in Sections 2–4.2. The supplementary appendix contains proofs for the generalizations in Section 4.3, as well as other omitted material.
22
A special case of (15), imposing the stronger requirement that minµ∈∆(S) c(µ) = 0 for all c ∈ C, appears
in the conclusion of Castagnoli, Cattelan, Maccheroni, and Tebaldi (in preparation), who note that this
special case is characterized by the following axiom in addition to our axioms: for all f ∈ F, p ∈ ∆(Z) and
α ∈ (0, 1), f % p =⇒ αf + (1 − α)p % p (F. Maccheroni, personal communication, June 2019).
23
Cerreia-Vioglio, Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Siniscalchi (2011) provide an alternative representation of this class of preferences that generalizes (2). As for GMM, the necessity of the axioms requires
joint restrictions on the weight function α(·) and other model parameters in (2) to ensure that W is monotone.
24
This follows from the fact that Siniscalchi’s (2009) vector expected utility model can accommodate these
paradoxes and is a special case of (15).
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A

Preliminaries

Throughout this section, we fix any interval Γ ⊆ R and let U := ΓS . For any a ∈ R, let
a denote the vector in RS with a(s) = a for all s ∈ S. For any φ, ψ ∈ RS , write φ ≥ ψ if
φ(s) ≥ ψ(s) for all s.

A.1

Properties of functionals

Fix any functional I : U → R. We call I: monotonic if I(φ) ≥ I(ψ) for all φ, ψ ∈ U
with φ ≥ ψ; normalized if I(a) = a for all a ∈ Γ; constant-additive if I(φ + a) = I(φ) + a
for all φ ∈ U and a ∈ Γ with φ + a ∈ U ; positively homogeneous if I(aφ) = aI(φ) for
all φ ∈ U and a ∈ R+ with aφ ∈ U ; and constant-linear if I is constant-additive and
positively homogeneous. It is easy to see that if 0 ∈ Γ, then any constant-linear functional
I is normalized.

A.2

Clarke derivative and differential

Consider a locally Lipschitz functional I : U → R. For every φ ∈ intU and ξ ∈ RS , the
Clarke (upper) derivative of I in φ in the direction of ξ is
I ◦ (φ; ξ) := lim sup
ψ→φ,t↓0

I(ψ + tξ) − I(ψ)
.
t

The Clarke (sub)differential of I at φ is the set
∂I(φ) := {χ ∈ RS : χ · ξ ≤ I ◦ (φ; ξ), ∀ξ ∈ RS }.
We will frequently invoke the following properties of the Clarke differential. First, if I is
locally Lipschitz, then Rademacher’s theorem yields a subset Û ⊆ intU such that U \ Û has
Lebesgue measure zero and I is differentiable on Û . Combining this with Theorem 2.5.1 in
Clarke (1990), we obtain the following approximation of the Clarke differential:
Lemma A.1 (Theorem 2.5.1 in Clarke (1990)). Suppose I : U → R is locally Lipschitz.
Then there exists Û ⊆ intU such that U \ Û has Lebesgue measure zero, I is differentiable at
each ψ ∈ Û , and for every φ ∈ intU , we have
∂I(φ) = co{lim ∇I(φn ) : φn → φ, φn ∈ Û }.
n

The next result is an “envelope theorem” for Clarke differentials:
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(17)

Lemma A.2 (Theorem 2.8.6 in Clarke (1990)). Suppose functional I : U → R is given by
I(·) = sup It (·)
t∈T

for some indexed family of functionals (It )t∈T with domain U . Assume that there exists some
K > 0 such that |It (ψ) − It (ξ)| ≤ Kkψ − ξk for every t ∈ T and ψ, ξ ∈ intU . Then for every
φ ∈ intU , we have ∂I(φ) ⊆ co{limi→∞ ∇Iti (φi ) : φi → φ, ti ∈ T, Iti (φ) → I(φ)}.
Last, we note the following relationship between properties of I and its Clarke differential:
Lemma A.3 (Part 1 of Proposition A.3 in GMM). If I : U → R is locally Lipschitz,
positively homogeneous, and 0 ∈ intU , then ∂I(φ) ⊆ ∂I(0) for all φ ∈ intU .
Lemma A.4 (Parts 2–3 of Proposition A.3 in GMM). If I : U → R is locally Lipschitz,
monotonic, and constant-additive, then ∂I(φ) ⊆ ∆(S) for all φ ∈ intU .

A.3

Boolean representation of locally Lipschitz I

Throughout this subsection, we assume that I : U → R is locally Lipschitz. Let Û be the
generic subset given by Lemma A.1.
Lemma A.6 below shows that, restricted to Û , I admits a so-called “Boolean” representation in terms of a family of affine functionals whose slopes correspond to gradients of I. This
result extends Ovchinnikov (2001), who establishes Lemma A.6 under the assumption that
I is continuously differentiable. Our non-smooth generalization is necessary for the proof
of Theorem 1, where the utility-act functional I is non-differentiable (except in the case of
subjective expected utility). We begin with a preliminary result:
Lemma A.5. For every φ, ψ ∈ Û and ε > 0, there exists ξ ∈ Û such that
I(ξ) − I(ψ) + ∇I(ξ) · (ψ − ξ) ≥ 0, I(ξ) − I(φ) + ∇I(ξ) · (φ − ξ) ≤ ε.
Proof. Take any φ, ψ ∈ Û and ε > 0. Let m := I(ψ) − I(φ). If ∇I(φ) · (ψ − φ) ≥ m, we can
set ξ = φ. Likewise if ∇I(ψ) · (ψ − φ) ≥ m, we can set ξ = ψ. It remains to consider the
case
∇I(φ) · (ψ − φ), ∇I(ψ) · (ψ − φ) < m.
(18)
Define
H(λ) := I(φ + λ(ψ − φ)) − λm − I(φ)
for each λ ∈ R with φ + λ(ψ − φ) ∈ U . Since φ, ψ ∈ Û , H is differentiable at λ ∈ {0, 1}, with
H(0) = H(1) = 0 and H 0 (0), H 0 (1) < 0 by assumption (18). Hence, H is negative for small
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enough λ > 0 and positive for λ < 1 close enough to 1. Thus, the set {λ ∈ (0, 1) : H(λ) = 0}
is nonempty and closed; let λ∗ denote its supremum.
´λ
Since H is locally Lipschitz, we have H(λ) = λ∗ H 0 (λ0 )dλ0 for all λ > λ∗ . As H(λ) > 0
for all λ ∈ (λ∗ , 1), we can choose λ∗∗ ∈ (λ∗ , 1) close enough to λ∗ such that H is differentiable
at λ∗∗ with H 0 (λ∗∗ ) > 0 and H(λ∗∗ ) ∈ (0, ε). But then
I(φ + (λ∗∗ + t)(ψ − φ)) − I(φ + λ∗∗ (ψ − φ))
− m > 0,
t→0
t

H 0 (λ∗∗ ) = lim
which implies that

I ◦ (φ + λ∗∗ (ψ − φ); ψ − φ) − m ≥ H 0 (λ∗∗ ) > 0.
Since I ◦ (ξ; ζ) = maxµ∈∂I(ξ) µ · ζ for any ζ, ξ (e.g., Proposition 2.1.2 in Clarke, 1990), this
yields some µ ∈ ∂I(φ + λ∗∗ (ψ − φ)) such that
µ · (ψ − φ) − m ≥ H 0 (λ∗∗ ) > 0.
By (17), there exists a sequence ξn → φ + λ∗∗ (ψ − φ) such that ξn ∈ Û for each n and
limn ∇I(ξn ) = µ. Then
lim (I(ξn ) − I(ψ) + ∇I(ξn ) · (ψ − ξn )) = I(φ + λ∗∗ (ψ − φ)) − I(ψ) + (1 − λ∗∗ )µ · (ψ − φ)
n

= H(λ∗∗ ) − (1 − λ∗∗ )m + (1 − λ∗∗ )µ · (ψ − φ) > 0
where the inequality uses the fact that H(λ∗∗ ) > 0 and that µ · (ψ − φ) − m ≥ H 0 (λ∗∗ ) > 0.
Similarly,
lim (I(ξn ) − I(φ) + ∇I(ξn ) · (φ − ξn )) = I(φ + λ∗∗ (ψ − φ)) − I(φ) − λ∗∗ µ · (ψ − φ)
n

= H(λ∗∗ ) + λ∗∗ m − λ∗∗ µ · (ψ − φ) < ε
where the inequality uses H(λ∗∗ ) < ε and µ · (ψ − φ) − m ≥ H 0 (λ∗∗ ) > 0. Thus, for any large
enough n, ξn ∈ Û is as desired.
We now establish the Boolean representation of I:
Lemma A.6. For each φ ∈ Û , we have
I(φ) = max inf I(ξ) + ∇I(ξ) · (φ − ξ),
ψ∈Û ξ∈Kψ

where Kψ := {ξ ∈ Û : I(ξ) + ∇I(ξ) · (ψ − ξ) ≥ I(ψ)} for all ψ ∈ Û .
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Proof. For each φ, ψ ∈ Û and ε > 0, Lemma A.5 yields some ξ ∈ Kψ such that I(ξ) + ∇I(ξ) ·
(φ−ξ) ≤ I(φ)+ε. Thus, inf ξ∈Kψ I(ξ)+∇I(ξ)·(φ−ξ) ≤ I(φ). Moreover, by definition of Kφ ,
inf ξ∈Kφ I(ξ) + ∇I(ξ) · (φ − ξ) ≥ I(φ). Hence, I(φ) = maxψ∈Û inf ξ∈Kψ I(ξ) + ∇I(ξ) · (φ − ξ),
as required.

B
B.1

Proofs for Section 2
Proof of Theorem 1

We invoke the following standard result:
Lemma B.1 (Lemma 1 in GMM). Preference % satisfies Axioms 1–5 if and only if there
exists a monotonic, constant-linear functional I : RS → R and a nonconstant affine function
u : ∆(Z) → R such that for all f, g ∈ F,
f % g ⇐⇒ I(u(f )) ≥ I(u(g)).

(19)

Moreover, I is unique and u is unique up to positive affine transformation.
The necessity proof for Theorem 1 is standard and we omit it. To prove sufficiency,
suppose % satisfies Axioms 1–5. Let I and u be as given by Lemma B.1. Consider the
collection P∗ given by (5), i.e.,
P∗ := cl{Pφ∗ : φ ∈ RS } with Pφ∗ := {µ ∈ ∂I(0) : µ · φ ≥ I(φ)},
where cl denotes the topological closure in K(∆(S)) under the Hausdorff topology.
Note that since I is monotonic and constant-linear, it is 1-Lipschitz. Thus, ∂I(0) ⊆ ∆(S)
by Lemma A.4, so that each Pφ∗ is indeed a closed, convex set of beliefs. Moreover, P∗ is
compact, as it is a closed subset of the compact space K(∆(S)). Thus, P∗ is a belief-set
collection. We will show that for all φ ∈ RS ,
I(φ) = max∗ min µ · φ,
P ∈P µ∈P

(20)

which by (19) ensures that (P∗ , u) is a DSEU representation of %.
Lemma A.1 yields a set Û ⊆ RS such that RS \ Û has Lebesgue measure zero and I is
differentiable on Û . Moreover, since I is positively homogeneous, Lemma A.3 implies that
∂I(φ) ⊆ ∂I(0) for all φ ∈ RS , so that for all φ ∈ Û , we have µφ := ∇I(φ) ∈ ∂I(0). We will
invoke the following lemma:
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Lemma B.2. For each φ ∈ Û , I(φ) = µφ · φ.
Proof. Take any φ ∈ Û . By positive homogeneity of I, αφ ∈ Û and ∇I(φ) = ∇I(αφ) for any
α ∈ (0, 1). Thus, the function h : [0, 1] → R defined by h(α) = I(αφ) is differentiable at every
´1
´1
α ∈ (0, 1) and Lipschitz. Hence, I(φ) = h(1) − h(0) = 0 h0 (α0 )dα0 = 0 (∇I(αφ) · φ)dα0 =
φ · µφ .
To complete the proof of (20), first take any φ, ψ ∈ Û and let Kψ := {ξ ∈ Û : I(ξ) + µξ ·
(ψ − ξ) ≥ I(ψ)} be as in Lemma A.6. Then
I(φ) = max inf I(ξ) + µξ · (φ − ξ) = max inf µξ · φ,
ψ∈Û ξ∈Kψ

ψ∈Û ξ∈Kψ

(21)

where the first equality holds by Lemma A.6 and the second by Lemma B.2. Letting Pψ :=
{µξ : ξ ∈ Û , µξ ·ψ ≥ I(ψ)}, Lemma B.2 ensures that ξ ∈ Kψ if and only if µξ ∈ Pψ . Moreover,
(17) implies that coPψ = Pψ∗ . Combining these two observations with (21) yields
I(φ) = max inf µ · φ = max min µ · φ = max min∗ µ · φ.
ψ∈Û µ∈Pψ

ψ∈Û µ∈coPψ

ψ∈Û µ∈Pψ

(22)

Next, take any φ, ψ ∈ RS . Then there exist sequences φn → φ, ψn → ψ such that
φn , ψn ∈ Û . For each n, pick µn ∈ Pψ∗n such that minµ∈Pψ∗n µ · φn = µn · φn and consider a
convergent subsequence (µnk ) with limk→∞ µnk = µ∗ . Note that µ∗ ∈ Pψ∗ : Indeed, for each
k, we have µnk · ψnk ≥ I(ψnk ), which by continuity of I implies µ∗ · ψ ≥ I(ψ).
Moreover, for each k, we have µnk · φnk = minµ∈Pψ∗n µ · φnk ≤ I(φnk ), where the inequality
k
holds by (22). Hence, continuity of I implies µ∗ · φ ≤ I(φ), so that
min∗ µ · φ ≤ µ∗ · φ ≤ I(φ).

µ∈Pψ

(23)

Since (23) holds for all ψ ∈ RS , it follows from the definition of P∗ that
min µ · φ ≤ I(φ)
µ∈P

holds for all P ∈ P∗ . Finally, applying (23) with ψ = φ yields minµ∈Pφ∗ µ · φ ≤ I(φ) ≤
minµ∈Pφ∗ µ · φ, where the second inequality holds by definition of Pφ∗ . Thus,
I(φ) = min∗ φ · µ = max∗ min µ · φ,
P ∈P µ∈P

µ∈Pφ

as required.
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B.2

Proof of Proposition 1

We begin with the following lemma:
Lemma B.3. Consider any functional I : RS → R and belief-set collection P such that
I(φ) = maxP ∈P minµ∈P µ · φ for all φ ∈ RS . Then
∂I(0) ⊆ co

[

P.

P ∈P

Proof. For each P ∈ P, let IP (φ) := minµ∈P µ · φ for each φ. Thus, I(φ) = maxP ∈P IP (φ) for
each φ. Note that each IP is 1-Lipschitz and ∂IP (0) = P .
Take any convergent sequence (∇IPi (φi )) where φi → 0, Pi ∈ P, and ∇IPi (φi ) exists for
each i. Then
∇IPi (φi ) ∈ ∂IPi (φi ) ⊆ ∂IPi (0) = Pi
S
where the set inclusion holds by Lemma A.3. Thus, limi ∇IPi (φi ) ∈ co P ∈P P . Hence, the
desired conclusion follows by applying Lemma A.2 to I.
Suppose % satisfies Axioms 1–5. Let I and u be as given by Lemma B.1. For P∗ as
S
in the sufficiency proof of Theorem 1, we have co P ∈P∗ P ⊆ ∂I(0). Thus, Lemma B.3
immediately implies that C = ∂I(0) is the unique closed, convex set satisfying (8) for all
DSEU representations of %, with equality for representation P∗ .

B.3

Proof of Corollary 1

Since the proof of Proposition 1 identifies the set of relevant priors as C = ∂I(0), Corollary 1
is immediate from the following result in GMM:
Lemma B.4 (Theorem 14 in GMM). Suppose % satisfies Axioms 1–5 and let I and u be as
in Lemma B.1. Then the unique closed, convex set D satisfying
f %∗ g ⇐⇒ Eµ [u(f )] ≥ Eµ [u(g)] for all µ ∈ D
is given by D = ∂I(0).

C
C.1

Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Lemma 1

We combine the proof of Lemma 1 with the proof of Theorem 2 (part 2) below.
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C.2

Proof of Theorem 2

Throughout the proof, let I be the functional given by Lemma B.1.
C.2.1

Proof of part 1

To prove the “only if” direction, suppose that % satisfies uncertainty aversion. Since it
admits the maxmin expected utility representation of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), I(φ) =
minµ∈C µ · φ holds for all φ.
We first show that ∩P ∈P P ⊇ C. If not, there exists P ∈ P such that P 6⊇ C. By the
standard property of support functions, this implies the existence of φ such that minµ∈C φ·µ <
minµ∈P φ · µ. This leads to I(φ) > minµ∈C µ · φ, a contradiction.
We now show that ∩P ∈P P ⊆ C. If not, there exists µ∗ ∈ ∩P ∈P P \ C. Then there exists φ
such that minµ∈C µ · φ > µ∗ · φ. But this implies I(φ) ≤ µ∗ · φ < minµ∈C µ · φ, a contradiction.
To prove the “ if” direction, suppose that ∩P ∈P P = C. Take any φ. It suffices to show
that I(φ) = minµ∈C µ · φ. Note that by construction of the representation P∗ defined by
(5), we have I(φ) ≥ minµ∈C µ · φ. But the representation based on P yields the inequality
I(φ) ≤ minµ∈∩P ∈P P µ · φ = minµ∈C µ · φ, which ensures the desired claim.
C.2.2

Proof of part 2 and Lemma 1

We prove the equivalence
absolute ambiguity aversion ⇔ ∞-ambiguity aversion ⇔ |S|-ambiguity aversion
\
⇔
P 6= ∅,
P ∈P

which implies both part 2 of Theorem 2 and Lemma 1.
The implication absolute ambiguity aversion ⇒ ∞-ambiguity aversion follows from the
proofs of Theorem 2a and Corollary 3a in Grant and Polak (2013), which imply the equivalence of absolute ambiguity aversion and ∞-ambiguity aversion for any preference with
a normalized, monotonic, continuous, constant-additive, and unbounded utility act functional I (as is the case for DSEU). The implication ∞- ambiguity aversion ⇒ |S|- ambiguity
aversion is trivial.
We now turn to the implication |S|-ambiguity aversion ⇒ ∩P ∈P P 6= ∅. If % satisfies
|S|-ambiguity aversion, then by part 3 of the theorem (see the proof below) any DSEU
representation (P, u) of % is such that every subcollection of P of cardinality at most |S| has
nonempty intersection. Since each Pi is convex and compact, Helly’s theorem implies that
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the whole collection P has nonempty intersection.25 This proves the implication.
T
Finally, we prove the implication P ∈P P 6= ∅ ⇒ absolute ambiguity aversion. Suppose
T
that there exists µ∗ ∈ P ∈P P for some DSEU representation (P, u) of %. For any f ∈ F and
any P ∈ P, this implies that minµ∈P µ · u(f ) ≤ µ∗ ·u(f ), and hence maxP ∈P minµ∈P µ · u(f ) ≤
µ∗ · u(f ). As a result,
f % p =⇒ max min µ · u(f ) ≥ u(p) =⇒ µ∗ · u(f ) ≥ u(p) =⇒ f %µ∗ p
P ∈P µ∈P

where %µ∗ is the subjective expected utility preference with belief µ∗ and utility function u.
Hence, % is more ambiguity-averse than %µ∗ , which proves the result.
C.2.3

Proof of part 3

The proof relies on the following lemma.
Lemma C.1. Suppose that preference % admits a DSEU representation (P, u). Then %
satisfies k-ambiguity aversion if and only if
k−1
X
i=1

max min µi · φi ≤ min max µ ·
Pi ∈P µi ∈Pi

P ∈P µ∈P

k−1
X

φi ,

for all φ1 , · · · , φk−1 ∈ RS .

(24)

i=1

Proof. To prove the “if” part, suppose inequality (24) is satisfied. Consider any f1 , · · · , fk ∈
F such that f1 ∼ fi for all i and k1 f1 + · · · + k1 fk = p for some p ∈ ∆(Z). We have
k−1

k−1

X1
X1
1
u(fi )) = u(p) − min max
u(fi ) · µ
I( u(fk )) = I(u(p) −
P ∈P µ∈P
k
k
k
i=1
i=1
≤ u(p) −

k−1
X
i=1

k−1

max min

Pi ∈P µi ∈Pi

X 1
1
u(fi ) · µi = u(p) −
I( u(fi )),
k
k
i=1

P
1
where the inequality holds by (24). Rearranging yields ki=1 I( u(fi )) ≤ u(p), which is
k
simply I(u(f1 )) ≤ u(p) since I(u(fi )) = I(u(f1 )) for all i. This is turn implies p % f1 , and
thus % satisfies k-ambiguity aversion.
To prove the “only if” part, suppose that there exist some vectors φ1 , · · · , φk−1 such
that the inequality (24) is violated. By the constant linearity of the max-min and min-max
functionals, we can assume without loss of generality that I(φi ) = I(φ1 ) for all i, and that
each φi belongs to [−1, 1]S .
25

Recall that ∆(S) has dimension |S| − 1.
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Let c ∈ R be given by c = −I(−φ1 − . . . − φk−1 ) + I(φ1 ), so that I(c − φ1 − · · · − φk−1 ) =
I(φ1 ). Note that c ∈ [−k, k]. Let φk ∈ RS be defined by φk = c − φ1 − · · · − φk−1 , which
implies φ1 + · · · + φk = c. Up to rescaling all the φi s and c by a common factor, this vector
φk also belongs to [−1, 1]S . By definition of c, we have I(φk ) = I(φ1 ), and
I(φk ) = I(c −

k−1
X

φi ) = c − min max µ ·

k−1
X

P ∈P µ∈P

i=1

φi > c −

i=1

=c−

k−1
X
i=1
k−1
X

max min µi · φi
Pi ∈P µi ∈Pi

I(φi ).

i=1

P
Rearranging yields ki=1 I(φi ) > c, which implies I(φ1 ) > kc .
To conclude the proof, we assume that u(z) ≥ 1, u(z) ≤ −1 for some outcomes z, z ∈ Z.
(This is without loss of generality by taking a positive affine transformation of u if necessary.)
Since each φi belongs to [−1, 1]S , it is possible to find weights (εsi ) such that the act fi that
maps each state s into the lottery εsi δz + (1 − εsi )δz̄ satisfies u(fi ) = φi . In addition, the
P
P
fact that ki=1 u(fi ) is a constant vector equal to c shows that ki=1 k1 fi is a constant act
that delivers a lottery p supported on {z̄, z}, where u(p) = kc . The collection (f1 , · · · , fk )
thus satisfies k1 f1 + · · · + k1 fk = p, fi ∼ f1 for all i since I(φi ) = I(φ1 ), and f1  p since
I(φ1 ) > kc = u(p). Hence, % does not satisfy k-ambiguity aversion.
Let us now prove part 3 of the theorem.
Sufficiency. Suppose that P1 ∩ · · · ∩ Pk 6= ∅ for all P1 , · · · , Pk ∈ P. Consider any
P1 , · · · , Pk and some vectors (φ1 , · · · , φk−1 ). Let µ ∈ P1 ∩ · · · ∩ Pk . We have
min

k−1
X

µ1 ∈P1 ,··· ,µk−1 ∈Pk−1

µi · φ i ≤

k−1
X

i=1

µ · φi ≤ max

i=1

µk ∈Pk

k−1
X

µk · φi

i=1

where the first inequality is due to the fact that µ ∈ Pi for all i ≤ k − 1, and the second
inequality is due to the fact that µ ∈ Pk . Since this is true for any P1 , · · · , Pk , this implies
max

min

(P1 ,··· ,Pk−1 )∈Pk−1 µ1 ∈P1 ,··· ,µk−1 ∈Pk−1

k−1
X

µi · φi ≤ min max

i=1

Pk ∈P µk ∈Pk

k−1
X

µk · φi ,

i=1

i.e.,
k−1
X
i=1

max min µi · φi ≤ min max µk ·
Pi ∈P µi ∈Pi

Pk ∈P µk ∈P

k−1
X

φi .

i=1

Thus, by Lemma C.1 % satisfies k-ambiguity aversion.
Necessity. Suppose that there exist P1 , · · · , Pk ∈ P such that P1 ∩· · ·∩Pk = ∅. Consider
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the sets A, B ⊆ RS(k−1) defined by
A = {(µ1 , · · · , µk−1 ) : µi ∈ Pi } and B = {(µk , · · · , µk ) : µk ∈ Pk }.
The sets A and B are compact and convex. In addition, A ∩ B = ∅ since any (µk , · · · , µk ) ∈
A∩B would satisfy µk ∈ P1 ∩· · ·∩Pk , which is a contradiction. By the separating hyperplane
theorem there exists a vector φ = (φ1 , · · · , φk−1 ) ∈ RS(k−1) , where each φi ∈ RS , such that
mina∈A a · φ > maxb∈B b · φ, which is equivalent to
min

k−1
X

µ1 ∈P1 ,··· ,µk−1 ∈Pk−1

µi · φi > max

k−1
X

µ∈Pk

i=1

µ · φi .

i=1

Hence,
k−1
X
i=1

max min µi · φi ≥
Pi ∈P µi ∈Pi

min

µ1 ∈P1 ,··· ,µk−1 ∈Pk−1

k−1
X

µi · φi > max
µ∈Pk

i=1

k−1
X

µ · φi ≥ min max µ ·

i=1

P ∈P µ∈P

k−1
X

φi .

i=1

Thus, by Lemma C.1 % does not satisfy k-ambiguity aversion.

C.3

Proof of Proposition 2

Note that m(E) = maxP ∈P minµ∈P µ(E), while m(E c ) = 1 − minP ∈P maxµ∈P µ(E). Thus,
AA(E) = minP ∈P maxµ∈P µ(E) − maxP ∈P minµ∈P µ(E).
This implies that AA(E) ≥ 0 if and only if all P, P 0 ∈ P satisfy maxµ∈P µ(E) ≥
minµ0 ∈P 0 µ0 (E), i.e., if and only if PE ∩ PE0 6= ∅. Similarly, AA(E) > 0 if and only if all
P, P 0 ∈ P satisfy maxµ∈P µ(E) > minµ0 ∈P 0 µ0 (E), i.e., if and only if PE ∩ PE0 is a nondegenerate interval.

C.4

Proof of Corollary 2

Pick any β > 0 and ν ∈ ∆(S) with β < mins∈S ν(s). Define P by P = {P F : F ∈ F}, where
for each F ∈ F,
P F := {µ ∈ ∆(S) : µ(F ) = ν(F ) +

β
, µ(E) ∈ [ν(E) − β, ν(E) + β] ∀E ⊆ S}.
2

Note that each P F is nonempty: Indeed, pick any s ∈ F and s0 ∈ F c (which exist since
F ∈
/ {S, ∅}). Then setting µ(s) = ν(s) + β2 , µ(s0 ) = ν(s0 ) − β2 , and µ(s00 ) = ν(s00 ) for all
s00 6= s, s0 yields µ ∈ P F . Since P F is also closed and convex, P is a well-defined belief-set
collection.
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c

Take any F ∈ F, and observe that PFF = {ν(F ) + β/2}, while PFF = {ν(F ) − β/2}.
c
Therefore, PFF ∩ PFF = ∅, which implies by Proposition 2 that AA(F ) < 0.
Consider now any E ∈ E, and any F ∈ F. Since E 6= F (as E and F are disjoint), we
either have (a) F \ E 6= ∅ =
6 E \ F ; (b) E ( F ; or (c) F ( E. In each case, we show that
0
F
there exist µ, µ ∈ P with µ(E) = ν(E) − β2 and µ0 (E) = ν(E) + β2 . Since this is true for
0
any F , this implies that PEF ∩ PEF ⊇ [ν(E) − β2 , ν(E) + β2 ] is a nondegenerate interval for any
F, F 0 ∈ F, which in turn implies that AA(E) > 0 by Proposition 2.
In case (a), pick s ∈ F \ E and s0 ∈ E \ F . Since E 6= F c (as F c ∈ F), there also exists
s00 ∈ S \ (E ∪ F ). Then define µ by µ(s) = ν(s) + β2 , µ(s0 ) = ν(s0 ) − β2 , and µ(s000 ) = ν(s000 )
for all s000 6= s, s0 ; and µ0 by µ0 (s) = ν(s) + β2 , µ0 (s0 ) = ν(s0 ) + β2 , µ0 (s00 ) = ν(s00 ) − β, and
µ0 (s000 ) = ν(s000 ) for all s000 6= s, s0 , s00 .
In case (b), pick s ∈ F \ E, s0 ∈ E, and s00 ∈ F c ⊆ E c . Then define µ by µ(s) = ν(s) + β,
µ(s0 ) = ν(s0 ) − β2 , µ(s00 ) = ν(s00 ) − β2 , and µ(s000 ) = ν(s000 ) for all s000 6= s, s0 , s00 ; and µ0 by
µ0 (s) = ν(s), µ(s0 ) = ν(s0 ) + β2 , µ(s00 ) = ν(s00 ) − β2 , and µ(s000 ) = ν(s000 ) for all s000 6= s, s0 , s00 .
In case (c), pick s ∈ F , s0 ∈ E \ F , and s00 ∈ E c ⊆ F c . Then define µ by µ(s) = ν(s) + β2 ,
µ(s0 ) = ν(s0 ) − β, µ(s00 ) = ν(s00 ) + β2 , and µ(s000 ) = ν(s000 ) for all s000 6= s, s0 , s00 ; and µ0 by
µ0 (s) = ν(s) + β2 , µ0 (s00 ) = ν(s00 ) − β2 , and µ0 (s000 ) = ν(s000 ) for all s000 6= s, s00 .

C.5

Proof of Corollary 3

Recall that the α-MEU functional (12) coincides with the DSEU representation (P, u) where
P = {αP + (1 − α){µ} : µ ∈ P }. Let P µ = αP + (1 − α){µ} for any µ ∈ P . For any event
E and µ ∈ P , the interval PEµ = {ν(E) : ν ∈ P µ } is thus given by [α minν∈P ν(E) + (1 −
α)µ(E), α maxν∈P ν(E) + (1 − α)µ(E)].
Suppose that α ≥ 1/2. Then, for any µ ∈ P and any event E, we have
α min ν(E) + (1 − α)µ(E) ≤ α min ν(E) + (1 − α) max ν(E)
ν∈P

ν∈P

ν∈P

1
1
≤ min ν(E) + max ν(E) ≤ (1 − α) min ν(E) + α max ν(E)
ν∈P
ν∈P
2 ν∈P
2 ν∈P
≤(1 − α)µ(E) + α max ν(E).
ν∈P

Hence, 1/2 minν∈P ν(E) + 1/2 maxν∈P ν(E) ∈ PEµ . Since this is true for every µ ∈ P , this
0
implies PEµ ∩ PEµ 6= ∅ for all µ, µ0 ∈ P . Thus, AA(E) ≥ 0 by the first part of Proposition 2.
Moreover, consider the case α > 1/2. Since P is not a singleton, there exists an event E
such that minν∈P ν(E) < maxν∈P ν(E). Then the above inequality is strict for each µ, i.e.,
α min ν(E) + (1 − α)µ(E) <
ν∈P

1
1
min ν(E) + max ν(E) < (1 − α)µ(E) + α max ν(E).
ν∈P
2 ν∈P
2 ν∈P
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0

Thus, for each µ, µ0 ∈ P , PEµ ∩ PEµ is a non-degenerate interval, which implies AA(E) > 0
by the second part of Proposition 2.
Next, suppose that α ≤ 1/2. Take any E and let µ be a minimizer of µ(E) on P , and µ0
be a maximizer. Since α ≤ 1/2, we have αµ0 (E)+(1−α)µ(E) ≤ αµ(E)+(1−α)µ0 (E). Since
0
PEµ = [µ(E), αµ0 (E) + (1 − α)µ(E)] and PEµ = [αµ(E) + (1 − α)µ0 (E), µ0 (E)], this proves
0
that PEµ ∩ PEµ is not a non-degenerate interval. Thus, by the second part of Proposition 2,
AA(E) ≤ 0. Moreover, consider the case α < 1/2. Since P is not a singleton, there exists
an event E such that minµ∈P µ(E) < maxµ∈P µ(E). Then the above inequality is strict, i.e.,
0
αµ0 (E) + (1 − α)µ(E) < αµ(E) + (1 − α)µ0 (E). Thus PEµ ∩ PEµ = ∅, which implies AA(E) < 0
by the first part of Proposition 2.

C.6

Proof of Proposition 3

T
Fix µ∗ ∈ i∈I,Pi ∈Pi Pi . For any i ∈ I and xi ∈ RS+ , define Ui (xi ) = maxPi ∈Pi minµi ∈Pi Eµi [ui (xi )].
First part: Suppose x is a feasible allocation that is not full insurance, i.e., xi is
P
P ∗
nonconstant for some i ∈ I. Let x̄i :=
i x̄i =
s µ (s)xi (s) for each i. Observe that
P ∗ P
S
s µ (s)
i xi (s) = w, so the profile (1x̄i )i∈I is a feasible allocation, where 1 ∈ R+ is a
vector of ones. For any i,
!
Ui (1x̄i ) = ui

X

∗

µ (s)xi (s)

≥

X

µ∗ (s)ui (xi (s)) ≥ max min

Pi ∈Pi µi ∈Pi

s

s

X

µi (s)ui (xi (s)) = Ui (xi ),

s

T
where the first inequality holds by concavity of ui and the second because µ∗ ∈ Pi ∈Pi Pi .
Moreover, the first inequality is strict for any i with nonconstant xi , as µ∗ is full support
and ui is strictly concave. This shows that x is Pareto dominated by (1x̄i )i∈I .
Conversely, suppose x is a feasible allocation that is full insurance. Consider any feasible
P
P
allocation y 6= x. Then, for some i, we have s µ∗ (s)xi (s) ≥ s µ∗ (s)yi (s) and yi 6= xi ,
P P
P P
because i s µ∗ (s)xi (s) = w = i s µ∗ (s)yi (s) by feasibility. Thus,
!
Ui (xi ) = ui

X
s

µ∗ (s)xi (s)

!
≥ ui

X

µ∗ (s)yi (s)

s

≥

X

µ∗ (s)ui (yi (s))

s

≥ max min

Pi ∈Pi µi ∈Pi

X

µi (s)ui (yi (s)) = Ui (yi ),

s

T
where the inequalities hold because ui is increasing and concave and µ∗ ∈ Pi ∈Pi Pi . If yi
is constant, the first inequality is strict as ui is strictly increasing. If yi is nonconstant, the
second inequality is strict as ui is strictly concave and µ∗ is full support. Hence, x is not
Pareto dominated by y.
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Second part: Consider a hypothetical economy in which each agent is a subjective
expected utility maximizer with belief µ∗ and consumption utility ui . Since each agent’s
preference over RS+ is continuous, strictly convex and strongly monotone, standard results
imply that this economy admits a competitive equilibrium allocation x and corresponding
P
price p ∈ RS++ . Thus, for any i and yi ∈ RS+ with yi · p ≤ ωi · p, we have s µ∗ (s)ui (xi (s)) ≥
P ∗
s µ (s)ui (yi (s)). Since x is Pareto efficient (by the first welfare theorem), it is full insurance
by the first part.
Now, consider the original economy. For any i and yi ∈ RS+ with yi · p ≤ ωi · p, we have
Ui (xi ) =

X

µ∗ (s)ui (xi (s)) ≥

s

X

µ∗ (s)ui (yi (s)) ≥ max min

Pi ∈Pi µi ∈Pi

s

X

µi (s)ui (yi (s)) = Ui (yi ),

s

where the first inequality holds by the previous paragraph and the second because µ∗ ∈
T
Pi ∈Pi Pi . Thus, x is a competitive equilibrium allocation.

C.7

Proof of Proposition 4

The result follows from the following three lemmas.
Lemma C.2. Any optimal schedule is such that lS − cS ≥ ls − cs for all s.
Proof. Suppose otherwise, and let s∗ ∈ {1, · · · , S − 1} be a state that maximizes ls − cs . For
any s ≥ 1,
min Eµ u[w − p(c) − l + c]

µ∈Ps

=(πs − ε)u[w − p(c) − ls + cs ] + (1 − πs + ε)u[w − p(c) − ls∗ + cs∗ ]
≤(π1 − ε)u[w − p(c) − ls + cs ] + (1 − π1 + ε)u[w − p(c) − ls∗ + cs∗ ]
≤(π1 − ε)u[w − p(c)] + (1 − π1 + ε)u[w − p(c) − ls∗ + cs∗ ]
= min Eµ u[w − p(c) − l + c],
µ∈P1

where the first inequality uses π1 ≥ πs and ls − cs ≤ ls∗ − cs∗ , and the second inequality uses
ls − cs ≥ 0. This shows that the agent’s value of schedule c is
V (c) = (π1 − ε)u[w − p(c)] + (1 − π1 + ε)u[w − p(c) − ls∗ + cs∗ ].
Consider the claim schedule c0 where c0s = cs for all s < S, and c0S = lS − ls∗ + cs∗ < cS .
Similar arguments prove that the value of schedule c0 equals
V (c0 ) = (π1 − ε)u[w − p(c0 )] + (1 − π1 + ε)u[w − p(c0 ) − ls∗ + cs∗ ],
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which is strictly larger than V (c) since p(c0 ) < p(c) due to c0S < cS . As a result, V (c0 ) > V (c),
which contradicts the optimality of c.
Lemma C.3. Any optimal schedule has a straight deductible.
Proof. Consider a tentative optimal schedule c. By Lemma C.2, we have lS − cS ≥ ls − cs
for all s, and arguments similar to those used in the proof of Lemma C.2 show that
V (c) = (π1 − ε)u[w − p(c)] + (1 − π1 + ε)u[w − p(c) − lS + cS ].

(25)

Let d = lS − cS , and consider s < S. By choice of d, cs ≥ max{0, ls − d}. If cs >
max{0, ls − d}, then replacing cs with max{0, ls − d} would strictly decrease p(c) without
affecting any of the other terms in (25), which would strictly increase V (c) and contradict
the optimality of c. As a result, we have cs = max{0, ls − d} for all s < S, and also for
s = S. Thus, c is the claim schedule with straight deductible d.
Lemma C.4. The optimal deductible is unique, nonincreasing in ε and equal to 0 if and
only if ε ≥ 0.
Proof. The value of the claim schedule with deductible d equals
(π1 − ε)u[w − Eπ max{0, l − d}] + (1 − π1 + ε)u[w − Eπ max{0, l − d} − d].
The above expression is continuous in d and thus admits a maximizer on [0, lS ]. To
simplify notation, let g(d) = w − Eπ max{0, l − d} and h(d) = g(d) − d. Both g and h
are concave, and g is increasing. Since u is increasing and strictly concave, the function
(π1 − ε)u ◦ g + (1 − π1 + ε)u ◦ h itself is strictly concave, yielding a unique maximizer.
To prove monotonicity, take ε < ε0 , and write d, d0 for the optimal deductible in each case.
Suppose toward a contradiction that d < d0 , which implies g(d) ≤ g(d0 ) and h(d) ≥ h(d0 ).
By optimality of d and d0 at ε and ε0 , respectively, we have
(π1 − ε)u[g(d)] + (1 − π1 + ε)u[h(d)] > (π1 − ε)u[g(d0 )] + (1 − π1 + ε)u[h(d0 )],
and
(π1 − ε0 )u[g(d0 )] + (1 − π1 + ε0 )u[h(d0 )] > (π1 − ε0 )u[g(d)] + (1 − π1 + ε0 )u[h(d)].
Note that the first inequality implies that u[h(d)] > u[h(d0 )]. Combining these inequalities
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and rearranging yields
u(g(d0 )) − u(g(d))
1 − π 1 + ε0
1 − π1 + ε
>
>
,
π1 − ε
u(h(d)) − u(h(d0 ))
π1 − ε 0
which is a contradiction since (1 − π1 + ε)/(π1 − ε) < (1 − π1 + ε0 )/(π1 − ε0 ).
Suppose that ε ≥ 0. Then the agent is absolutely ambiguity averse and is more ambiguityaverse than the subjective expected utility maximizer with utility u and belief π. Thus, as
noted in the text, since insurance is actuarially fair at belief π, full insurance is optimal, i.e.,
d = 0.
Now, suppose that ε < 0. For any d < l2 , the value of the schedule with deductible d
equals (π1 − ε)u[w − Eπ l + (1 − π1 )d] + (1 − π1 + ε)u[w − Eπ l − π1 d]. This expression is
differentiable with respect to d and the derivative at d = 0 equals [(π1 − ε)(1 − π1 ) − π1 (1 −
π1 + ε)]u0 [w − Eπ l], which is strictly positive since ε < 0 and u is strictly increasing. Thus,
the optimal deductible is strictly positive.

D
D.1

Proofs for Section 4
Proof of Proposition 5

Below we fix the unique functional I : RS → R associated with %, as given by Lemma B.1.
We begin with the following lemma:
Lemma D.1. Suppose (P, u) is a DSEU representation of %. Then P = cl{Hφ,λ : φ ∈
RS , λ ≤ I(φ)}.
Proof. First, take any φ ∈ RS , λ ∈ R such that λ ≤ I(φ). Since (P, u) represents %, there
exists P ∈ P such that minµ∈P µ · φ = I(φ). Thus, P ⊆ Hφ,I(φ) ⊆ Hφ,λ , which implies
Hφ,λ ∈ P. This proves that P ⊇ cl{Hφ,λ : φ ∈ RS , λ ≤ I(φ)}.
Conversely, consider any φ ∈ RS , λ ∈ R such that there exists P 0 ∈ P with P 0 ⊆ Hφ,λ .
Since (P, u) represents %, I(φ) ≥ minµ∈P 0 µ · φ ≥ minµ∈Hφ,λ φ · µ. Hence, λ ≤ I(φ). This
proves that P ⊆ cl{Hφ,λ : φ ∈ RS , λ ≤ I(φ)}.
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose first that (P0 , u0 ) is another DSEU representation of %.
Then the fact that P = P0 is immediate from Lemma D.1 and the uniqueness of I. The proof
that u ≈ u0 is standard.
Conversely, suppose that u ≈ u0 and P = P0 . To show that (P0 , u0 ) represents %, it suffices
to show that maxP 0 ∈P0 minµ∈P 0 µ · φ = I(φ) for all φ ∈ RS . To prove this, observe first that
since (by Lemma D.1) Hφ,I(φ) ∈ P = P0 , there exist sequences of Pn0 ∈ P0 and half-spaces Hn ⊇
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Pn0 with Hn → Hφ,I(φ) . Then, for all φ, we have minµ∈Hφ,I(φ) µ · φ = I(φ) = limn minµ∈Hn µ · φ
and minµ∈Hn µ · φ ≤ minµ∈Pn0 µ · φ for all n. This implies that maxP 0 ∈P minµ∈P 0 µ · φ ≥ I(φ).
Suppose next that minµ∈P 00 µ · φ − I(φ) =: ε > 0 for some P 00 ∈ P0 . Then Hφ,I(φ)+ε ⊇ P 00 ,
which implies Hφ,I(φ)+ε ∈ P0 . Since P0 = P, this contradicts Lemma D.1.
Finally, note that the half-space closure of P is P itself. Thus, by the previous paragraph,
(P, u) is itself a DSEU representation of %.

D.2

Proof of Proposition 6

For each preference %i , let utility ui and functional Ii be as given by Lemma B.1. Note that
%1 is more ambiguity-averse than %2 if and only if u1 ≈ u2 and I1 (φ) ≤ I2 (φ) for all φ ∈ RS .
Thus, it suffices to show that I1 (φ) ≤ I2 (φ) for all φ if and only if P1 ⊆ P2 .
Suppose first that I1 (φ) ≤ I2 (φ) for all φ. Then {Hφ,λ : φ ∈ RS , λ ≤ I1 (φ)} ⊆ {Hφ,λ :
φ ∈ RS , λ ≤ I2 (φ)}. By Lemma D.1, this implies that P1 ⊆ P2 .
Conversely, if P1 ⊆ P2 , then maxP ∈P1 minµ∈P µ · φ ≤ maxP ∈P2 minµ∈P µ · φ for all φ. Since
(Pi , ui ) is a DSEU representation of %i for i = 1, 2, this inequality means that I1 (φ) ≤ I2 (φ)
for all φ.
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Supplementary Appendix to “Dual-self representations of
ambiguity preferences”
Madhav Chandrasekher, Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, Yves Le Yaouanq

This supplementary appendix is organized as follows. Appendix S.1 presents the proofs
for the generalizations of DSEU considered in Section 4.3. Appendix S.2 considers the representation obtained by inverting the order of moves of Optimism and Pessimism. Appendix S.3
presents an incompatibility result for source dependence under Klibanoff, Marinacci, and
Mukerji’s (2005) smooth model.
S.1
S.1.1

Proofs for Section 4.3
Proof of Theorem 3

We will invoke the following result from MMR:
Lemma S.1.1 (Lemma 28 in MMR). Preference % satisfies Axioms 1–4 and Axiom 8 if
and only if there exists a nonconstant affine function u : ∆(Z) → R with U := (u(∆(Z)))S
and a normalized niveloid I : U → R such that I ◦ u represents %.
Recall that functional I : U → R is a niveloid if I(φ) − I(ψ) ≤ maxs (φs − ψs ) for all
φ, ψ ∈ U . Lemma 25 in MMR shows that I is a niveloid if and only if it is monotonic and
constant-additive.
Based on this result, the necessity direction of Theorem 3 is standard. We now prove the
sufficiency direction. Suppose % satisfies Axioms 1–4 and Axiom 8. Let I, u, and U be as
given by Lemma S.1.1. Since I is a niveloid, it is 1-Lipschitz. Hence, Lemma A.1 yields a
subset Û ⊆ intU with U \ Û of Lebesgue measure 0 such that I is differentiable on Û . Define
µψ := ∇I(ψ) and wψ := I(ψ) − ∇I(ψ) · ψ for each ψ ∈ Û . By Lemma A.4 and the fact that
niveloids are monotonic and constant-additive, µψ ∈ ∆(S) for all ψ ∈ Û . For each ψ ∈ U ,
define
Dψ := {(µ, w) ∈ ∆(S) × R : µ · ψ + w ≥ I(ψ)} ∩ co{(µξ , wξ ) : ξ ∈ Û },
and let D := {Dψ : ψ ∈ U }. The following lemma implies that each Dψ is nonempty; note
also that it is closed, convex, and bounded below.
Lemma S.1.2. For every φ, ψ ∈ U , min(µ,w)∈Dψ µ · φ + w ≤ I(φ) with equality if φ = ψ.
1

Proof. First, consider any φ, ψ ∈ Û . Let Kψ := {ξ ∈ Û : µξ · ψ + wξ ≥ I(ψ)} be as in
Lemma A.6. Note that Dψ = co{(µξ , wξ ) : ξ ∈ Kψ }, so that
inf µξ · φ + wξ =

ξ∈Kψ

min µ · φ + w,
(µ,w)∈Dψ

where the minimum is attained as Dψ is closed and bounded below. Thus, Lemma A.6
implies that
min µ · φ + w ≤ I(φ),
(26)
(µ,w)∈Dψ

where, by definition of Dψ , (26) holds with equality if ψ = φ.
Next, consider any φ, ψ ∈ U . Take sequences φn → φ, ψn → ψ such that φn , ψn ∈ Û for
each n, where we choose φn = ψn if φ = ψ. For each n, the previous paragraph yields some
(µn , wn ) ∈ Dψn such that µn · φn + wn = min(µ,w)∈Dψn µ · φn + w ≤ I(φn ), with equality if
φ = ψ. Thus, for each n, we have I(ψn ) − µn · ψn ≤ wn ≤ I(φn ) − µn · φn . Since φn → φ,
ψn → ψ, and I is continuous, this implies that sequence (wn ) is bounded. Thus, up to
restricting to a suitable subsequence, we can assume that (µn , wn ) → (µ∞ , w∞ ) for some
(µ∞ , w∞ ) ∈ ∆(S) × R. Then (µ∞ , w∞ ) ∈ Dψ and µ∞ · φ + w∞ ≤ I(φ) by continuity of I,
with equality if φ = ψ. Thus, min(µ,w)∈Dψ µ · φ + w = inf (µ,w)∈Dψ µ · φ + w ≤ I(φ), with
equality if φ = ψ, where the minimum is attained since Dψ is closed and bounded below.
Finally, we obtain a dual-self variational representation of % as follows. For each D ∈ D,
define cD : ∆(S) → R ∪ {∞} by cD (µ) := inf{w ∈ R : (µ, w) ∈ D} for each µ ∈ ∆(S),
where by convention the infimum of the empty set is ∞. Note that cD is convex for all D
by convexity of D. Moreover, for all φ ∈ U , min(µ,w)∈D µ · φ + w = minµ∈∆(S) µ · φ + cD (µ).
Thus, Lemma S.1.2 implies
I(φ) = max min µ · φ + cD (µ)
D∈D µ∈∆(S)

(27)

for all φ ∈ U . Since I is normalized, applying (27) to any constant vector a ∈ U , yields I(a) =
a+maxD∈D minµ∈∆(S) cD (µ) = a. Hence, C∗ := {cD : D ∈ D} satisfies maxc∈C∗ minµ∈∆(S) c(µ) =
0 and (C∗ , u) is a dual-self variational representation of % by Lemma S.1.1.
Remark 3. We note that our characterization of the set of relevant priors under DSEU
generalizes to the dual-self variational model. Specifically, let dom(c) := {µ : c(µ) ∈ R}
denote the effective domain of any cost function. Then there exists a unique closed, convex

S
set C such that C ⊆ co c∈C dom(c) for all dualf-self variational representations of %, with
equality for the representation C∗ we constructed in the proof of Theorem 3. Moreover, it
can again be shown that C is the Bewley set of the unambigous preference %∗ . The argument
2

S

relies on the observation that C = co
∂I(φ)
, where I is the utility act functional
φ∈intU
obtained in the proof of Theorem 3 and U its domain. Details are available on request. N
S.1.2

Proof of Theorem 4

The following result follows from a minor modification of the proof of Lemma 57 in CMMM:
Lemma S.1.3. Preference % satisfies Axioms 1–4 and 9 if and only if there exists a nonconstant affine function u : ∆(Z) → R with U := (u(∆(Z)))S and a monotonic, normalized
and continuous functional I : U → R such that I ◦ u represents %.
Based on this result, the necessity direction of Theorem 4 is standard. We now prove the
sufficiency direction. Suppose % satisfies Axioms 1–4 and 9. Let I, u, and U be as given by
Lemma S.1.3. Define Dψ := {(µ, I(ψ) − µ · ψ) ∈ RS+ × R : µ ∈ RS+ } for each ψ ∈ U . Note
that Dψ is nonempty and convex. Let Iψ (φ) := inf (µ,w)∈Dψ µ · φ + w for each φ, ψ ∈ U .
Take any φ, ψ ∈ U . Observe that

I(ψ) if φ ≥ ψ
Iψ (φ) = inf I(ψ) + α(φs − ψs ) =
α>0,s∈S
−∞ if φ 6≥ ψ
Thus, I(φ) ≥ Iψ (φ) by monotonicity of I, with equality if φ = ψ. That is, for each φ ∈ U ,
I(φ) = max Iψ (φ).
ψ∈U

(28)

For each ψ ∈ U , define a function Gψ : R × ∆(S) → R ∪ {∞} by
Gψ (t, µ) = sup{Iψ (ξ) : ξ ∈ U, ξ · µ ≤ t}
for each (t, µ). The map is quasi-convex (Lemma 31 in CMMM) and increasing in t.
Lemma S.1.4. We have Iψ (φ) = inf µ∈∆(S) Gψ (µ · φ, µ) for each φ, ψ ∈ U .
Proof. Observe that RHS = inf µ∈∆(S) sup{Iψ (ξ) : ξ · µ ≤ φ · µ}. To see that LHS ≤ RHS,
observe that Iψ (φ) ≤ sup{Iψ (ξ) : ξ · µ ≤ φ · µ} holds for any µ ∈ ∆(S). To see that LHS ≥
RHS, note first that if φ ≥ ψ then LHS = I(ψ) and RHS ∈ {I(ψ), −∞}, so the inequality
clearly holds. If φ 6≥ ψ then φs < ψs for some s ∈ S. Thus, by taking µ = δs , any ξ with
ξ · µ ≤ φ · µ satisfies ξs ≤ φs , which implies ξ 6≥ ψ, whence Iψ (ξ) = −∞.
Setting G = {Gφ : φ ∈ U }, Lemma S.1.4 and (28) ensure that the functional W given
by (16) represents % and is continuous. Finally, note that since I is normalized, we have
a = I(a) = maxG∈G inf µ∈∆(S) G(a, µ) for any a ∈ R, as required.
3

S.2

Minmax DSEU representation

While DSEU assumes that Optimism plays first and Pessimism plays second, this is equivalent to a model with the opposite order of moves. We omit all proofs for this section, as
they can be obtained as minor modifications of the original proofs for DSEU.
Theorem S.2.1. Preference % satisfies Axioms 1–5 if and only if % admits a minmax
DSEU representation, i.e., there exists a belief-set collection Q and a nonconstant affine
utility u : ∆(Z) → R such that
W (f ) = min max Eµ [u(f )]
Q∈Q µ∈Q

represents %.
Our construction of the maxmin DSEU representation considered in the text uses the
belief-set collection P∗ = cl{Pφ∗ : φ ∈ RS } with Pφ∗ := {µ ∈ ∂I(0) : µ·φ ≥ I(φ)}. Analogously,
it can be shown that the belief-set collection Q∗ := cl{Q∗φ : φ ∈ RS } with Q∗φ := {µ ∈
∂I(0) : µ · φ ≤ I(φ)} yields a minmax DSEU representation. Paralleling Section 2.3, it is
straightforward to show that C := ∂I(0) again corresponds to the smallest set of priors that
S
is contained in co Q∈Q Q for all minmax DSEU representations Q of %, with equality for
representation Q∗ .
While the different notions of ambiguity aversion are most conveniently characterized
using the maxmin DSEU representation (cf. Theorem 2), the minmax DSEU representation
is useful for characterizing their ambiguity-seeking counterparts. Axioms 10 and 11 and
Theorem S.2.2 below provide the analogs of Axioms 6 and 7 and Theorem 2, respectively.
Axiom 10 (Uncertainty Seeking). If f, g ∈ F with f ∼ g, then

1
1
f + g - f.
2
2

Axiom 11 (k-Ambiguity Seeking). For all f1 , ..., fk ∈ F with f1 ∼ f2 ∼ · · · ∼ fk and any
p ∈ ∆(Z),
1
1
f1 + · · · + fk = p ⇒ p - f1 .
k
k
We say that % is absolutely ambiguity-seeking if there exists a nondegenerate subjective
expected utility preference that is more ambiguity-averse than %. Analogous to Lemma 1,
this is characterized by ∞-ambiguity seeking, i.e., k-ambiguity seeking for all k.
Theorem S.2.2. Suppose that % admits a minmax DSEU representation (Q, u). Then:
\
1. % satisfies uncertainty seeking if and only if
Q = C;
Q∈Q

4

2. % is absolutely ambiguity-seeking if and only if

\

Q 6= ∅;

Q∈Q

3. % satisfies k-ambiguity seeking if and only if
S.3

T

i=1,··· ,k

Qi 6= ∅ for all Q1 , · · · , Qk ∈ Q.

Source dependence and the smooth model

Recall that under Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji’s (2005) (henceforth, KMM’s) smooth
model, % is represented by the functional
ˆ
W (f ) =

φ(u(f ) · µ) dν(µ),

(29)

for some Borel probability measure ν ∈ ∆(∆(S)) over beliefs, nonconstant affine u : ∆(Z) →
R, and strictly increasing φ : u(Z) → R. For expositional simplicity, we consider Z = [0, 1].
Assume that u is strictly increasing and continuous on Z with u(0) = 0, and that φ is twice
continuously differentiable with φ0 (0), φ00 (0) 6= 0.
Analogous to Corollary 4 for the α-MEU model, the following claim establishes a sense
in which the smooth model is incompatible with source-dependent negative and positive
ambiguity attitudes:
Claim 1. Suppose that % admits a representation (29). Then there do not exist events
E, F, G ⊆ S such that for all x > 0,
xE 0  xF 0  xG 0

and

xE c 0  xF c 0  xGc 0

(30)

and such that µ(F ) is constant across all µ in the support of ν.26
Proof. Suppose toward a contradiction that such events E, F, G exist. For each event A ⊆ S
and ∆ ∈ [0, u(1)], let
ˆ
WA (∆) :=

φ(µ(A)∆) dν(µ).

Then W (xA 0) = WA (u(x)) for all x > 0. Thus, (30) implies that, for all ∆ ∈ [0, u(1)],
WE (∆) > WF (∆) > WG (∆)
26

and

WE c (∆) > WF c (∆) > WGc (∆).

See Theorem 3 in KMM for a behavioral characterization of such unambiguous events F .
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(31)

Observe that, for each A, we have WA (0) = φ(0), and
∂
WA (∆) =
∂∆

ˆ

φ0 (µ(A)∆)µ(A) dν(µ)
ˆ
0
= φ (0) µ(A) dν(µ) at ∆ = 0,
ˆ
∂2
WA (∆) =
φ00 (µ(A)∆)µ(A)2 dν(µ)
∂∆2
ˆ
00
= φ (0) µ(A)2 dν(µ) at ∆ = 0.
Let α be the constant such that α = µ(F ) for all µ in the support of ν. Then, performing
´
a first-order Taylor approximation, the first inequalities in (31) imply µ(E) dν(µ) ≥ α ≥
´
´
µ(G) dν(µ). Likewise, the second inequalities in (31) imply µ(E c ) dν(µ) ≥ 1 − α ≥
´
µ(Gc ) dν(µ). Thus,
ˆ
ˆ
µ(E) dν(µ) = α =

µ(G) dν(µ).

(32)

Note that it is not the case that µ(E) = α for ν-almost every µ, as this would imply
WE (∆) = WF (∆), contradicting WE (∆) > WF (∆). Likewise, it is not the case that µ(G) =
α for ν-almost every µ, as this would contradict WF (∆) > WG (∆). Thus, by Jensen’s
inequality
ˆ
ˆ
µ(E)2 dν(µ),

µ(G)2 dν(µ) > α2 .

Hence, performing a second-order Taylor approximation, WE (∆) > WF (∆) and (32) implies
that φ00 (0) > 0. Likewise, WF (∆) > WG (∆) and (32) implies that φ00 (0) < 0. This is a
contradiction.
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